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"OUR C.i::NTRAL BANKING SYSffl~ - - A Lesson
in Honey Hanagement 11

Chapter I

IN .TROD UC TIO N
The purpose of this study is to set forth so~e of tho
fundamental principles of the .American Banking System in
their relationship to the changing progress of other American businesses •.
In this study an attempt has been made to organize

the materials at hand in such a manner as to give the reader
a clear understanding of how the system is set up , how it is
organized, and how it is controlled.

Stress has been placed

chiefly on what is termed the Federal Reserve System and its
function in the American economy.
The problems, including questions to which answers must
be soueht were as follows :
1.

What influence did banks in Jngland have upon the

Central Banking System of America?
2.

How did the State Bank Growth in the Unft:ted States

after 1816 renovate the American Banking System after the
failure of the First and Second Banks of the United States?

-2-

3. What were the conditions eY.isting under the State
Bank era that led Congress to enact the National Bank Act
in 1863?

4. What were the existing conditions under the National
Banking Systen that gave rise to the Federal Reserve System!

5 •. How. did the operation of the Federal Reserve System
become a lesson in Money Management?

PROCEDURE AND SOURCES OF DATA
One method employed in this study was a personal letter
written and sent to the following banks and banking institu1

tions.

Valuable information was received as follows:

Banks of Corpus C1;g:isti, Texas:
1.

Citizen State Bank, 2402 Leopard Street; Letter
received from, Heyward White, E.,"'"ecutive VicePresident: Literature - "Our Financial
System at Work", Monetary Study No. l; and
~ Federal Reserve System - Its Purposes
and Function.

2.

Corpus Christi Bank and Trust Company, P. o. Box
780; Letter received from w. P. Pittman, First
Vice-President.
The Corpus Christi National Bank, P. o. Drawer
301; Letter received from J. N. Weesner,
Assistant Vice-President.

Banks of San Antonio, Te:r..a,s:
1

This material is available to the reader upon request.
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1.

The Alamo National Bank, P. o. Box 900 · Letter
received from Claude C. Menger, Credit
Manager.

2.

First National Bank of San Antonio, P. o. Box
2479; Letter received from G. O. Stone, First
Vice- President.

J. Frost National Bank, San Antonio 6, Texas;
Letter received from H. T. Hebdon, VicePresident.

4. National Bank of Commerce, P. o. Drawer 121;
Letter received from Henry L Hart, Chairman Executive Committee.
Banks

~

Houston, Texas:

1.

Citizens Sta.te Bank, 400 Main : No response.

2.

First National Bank in Hous ton, 201 Main : No
response.

J. Houston Bank & Trust Company, Main Street and
Franklin Ave.; Letter received from v. B.
Dishongh, Vice President and Cashier.

4. Houston National Bank, P~ o. Box 2518; Letter
received from Michael Murphy, Asst. VicePresident: Literature - 11 4000 Years of
Bankingn.
Banks of Dallas, TeY..rua:
1.

Dallas National Bank, 1530 Hain; No response.

2.

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Station K;
Literature - ~ Federal Reserve System Its
Purposes~ Function.

3 •. First National Bank, lli-01 ~Iain Street; Letter

received from Dr. Arthur A. Smith, Vied
President and Economist: Literature 11 0ur Financial System at Work".

National Bank of Commerce, 914 Elm; No response.
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Banks of Fort Worth, TeY.as :
1.

The Firot National Bank of Fort Worth, P. o. Box
226o; Letter received from Najorie McMahon
Public Relations Department: Literature - '
"This Thing Called Profifs 11 , 11 This is Your
Bank", 11 How Knowledge can Harm a Bank: 11
"Bulletin of the American Institute 6f'
Banking , October 195411 , "Banking - Journal
of the American Bankers Association January
1955 11 •
,

2.

The Fort Worth National Bank, P. O. Box 2050 ;
Letter received from Reed Sass , Vice- President .

Ban.lcs of Galveston, 1™=
1.

The First National Bank of Galveston, P. o.
Box 36o; Letter received from A. F. Holhn,
Asst . Vice-President .

2.

United States National Bank, Galveston, Texas;
Letter received from Robert A. Vineyard,
Vice- President; Literature - 11 The Guaranty
Survey, February 1955 , 11 The Depression That
Didn ' t Happen~ and "The Political Hr. Patm.an 11 •

Banks of Robstown. , 1™=
1.

Robstovm Bank and Trust Company, Robstmm, Te:;:as;
No response .

2.

The State National Bank, P. O. Drawer !fo . 1268;
Letter received from A. E. Russ , President .

Banks £1'._ New Orlea.n.s,, Louisiana:
1.

The National Bank of Commerce , Baronne and
Comraon Streets, Letter received from Robert
D. Hess , Director of blic Relations .

2.

Whitney National Bank of New Orleans; No re sponse .

American Institute of Banking, 12 F.ast 36 Street, New York
16, N. Y.; Letter received from Leroy Le-.i.s , National
Educational Director; Literature - 11 Banld:ng - Journal of
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the American Bankers Association, March 1955 11 Bulletin
of the .American Institute of Banking January'195511
Honey .fill.d Banki,µ__g - by Weldon ilflfu.g, Bank Admini~tration
and Fundamentals of Banking .
'
Department of Commerce , -lashington 25 , D. c. ; Letter
received from J . 0. ~lictake , Chief, Communications
Branch.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington
25, D. C. : Literature - 11 The Treasury- Central Bank
Relationship in Foreign Countries", 11 Compilation of
Federal and State Laws R~lating to Branch Banking within the United States" , 11 Federal Reserve Bank Responsibilities11 , 111-Ionetary and Credit Developments Since Nid- 1953 11 ,
and 'lhe Federal Reserve System Its PUJ.::;poses and Function.
The writer admits that the majority of these banks is located
in the Sta;te of Texas .

Since they are all members of the Federal

Reserve System, the information received from them was adequate
enough to supply the writer with certain needed materials , and
would not have differed appreciably from material sent by any other
banks who are members of the Federal Rezerve System, although they
may be located in other states and in other Federal Reserve
Dfotricts.
All the banks in the city of Corpus Christi were interviewed
personally by the writer .

These banks supplied not only oral

ev~dence , but printed matter also .
This study also included mterial from Federal Reserve
Publications , Statistical Abstract~ the United States and books
found in the ~·1. R. Banks Library, Corpus Christi Public Library,
Coles High School Library - Corpus Christi , Texas and economic
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literature from the personal libr ary of Dr. Frederic A. Jackson,
Professor of Economics, Morgan State College, Baltimore , Maryland ,
who at the time of writing was acting as Visiting Professor of
Economics - Prairie View Agricultural and Mechanical College, and
advisor to the writer.
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CHAPTER II
AN OVZR VIK.l OF CEilTRAL B IIB:ING IN ITS EUROPEAN
BACKGROUND

...:.oarly European
Bankina

in England :

Banking in America particularly in the United States,
reflects , for the most part, its Zuropeon counterpart .
lfode_rn Commercial banking may be said to have begun with
the establishment of the Bank of England in 1694.

It is

awarded the title of "mother of central banks" because it led
1

the way in acquiring and exer cising central banking powers .
The bank was organized upon the l oan by the stockhol ders
of 1 , 200 , 000 pounds to the government at 8 per cent .

This was

equal to the amount of capital of the bank - and this eA--plains
why Parliament was willing to grant it a charter .

Al though the

charter was granted fo r only 10- year period, it was extended
from time to time , usually on condition that furthe r loan be
granted to the government or that the interest rates appliable
2

to outstanding loans be r educed.
1

Char les A. Conant , A History .Qi Modern Bank2 of Issue , G. P.
Putnam ' s Sons , Ne;:; Yor k, 1915, Chapter IT, p . 78
2

Ibid, P• 86
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The bank was authorized to issue notes , to deal in coin
and bullion and commercial bills , and to lend on security, but
it was forbidden to deal in merchandise .

The bank commenced

business with no cash, its assets consisting wholly of interest-bearing government bonds .

Since the bank was empowered

to issue de;:iand notes to the amount of the loan, this was
3
not a serious handicap .
The Bank of .8ngland was the only joint- stock bank organized until 1826.

It had for competitors in the com."llercial

field the private banks which were proprietorships anc:. partnerships .

As the private banks customarily issued their own

notes , the grant of the note-issue power to the Bank of
4
..:::n.gland did not give it a ~onoply in that respect .

In performing its duties as the governmmt ' s baIL~er ,
the Bank of ;Jngland was brought into close contact with the
private banks , and the latter soon recognized the convenience
of keeping de,osit balances with it .

Deposit balances were

especially advantageous because the bank was the principal
issue o_ notes, and the private banks could obtain supplies
of note in ti::i.e of need by merely drawing upon their deposit
accounts .
3
Bray Hamond, "Historical Introduction" , Banking Studies ,
fashington : Board of Governors , 1941, P• 36

4
Sir John Clapham, ~ Bank .Qi 2lngland, New York , l-lacmillan
Company, 1945 , p . 381

-9-

By legislation adopted in 1826, Parliament authorized
the organization of joint-stock commercial banks and empowered
those located outside a 65-mile radius of London to issue
their m-m notes.

Thus the privileged position of the Bank

of ::0.gland in joint-stock banking, as well as in note issue,
was undermined; but legislation adopted in 1833 made its
notes leeal tender while failing to grant that privilege to
the notes of other banks; and the Bank Act of 1844 limited
the notes of the other joint-stock banks to fixed amotmts,
and provided for the suspension of their note-issue autljority
5
under certain circumstances.
The duty of the Bank of ~ngland to control the volume
of noney in circulation came gradually to be recognized,
especially after the adoption of the Bank Act of 1844.

It

assumed leadership in meeting difficulties occasioned by the
various crises of the later part of the nineteenth century.
On

most of these occasions, the Bank of lligland was empowered

through the

11

suspension of the Bank Act 11 to turn out emergency

issues of its notes, and thus its status as the
last resort" caIIB to be acc~pted.

11

lender of

In 1890, when the great

banking house of Baring Brothers failed, the Bank of 2n.gland
was able to avert a panic by persuading other financial
5
Conant,

.Q.D..

ill•, p . 82
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institutions to join with it in guaranteeing the i:ayment at
6

maturity of all outstanding Bari ng obligations .
Banking in Greece and Rome :
7

Accordine to Conant,

the credit mechanism was much

more fully developed in Assyra and Babylon than in early
Greece and :W:::n.e.

One of the first forms o~ banking in Greece

was the exchanee of foreign moneys for domestic moneys arx:i the
return of foreign coin to the country of origin.

The bankers

of both Athens and ome were known as dealers in silver, and
money exchanges performed a very important function in international trade in both countries .

The Athenian silver drach-

mans appear to have been widely accepted in foreign trade .
Banking flourished both in ancient Greece and in Rome ,
but it was not a patrician calling , being carried on by
foreigners and freedmen .

Both Greek and Rome bankers received

money on deposit and paid it out on order much like our check
system.

The bankers were first money-changers , then receivers

of deposits, then lenders at credit, both of their own money
and that entrusted to them, and purchasers of bills of exchange .

6'
Ibid, p . 93
7

Charles A. Conant , !. History .Qi: Hodern Banks of Issue , G. P.
Puttman ' s Company, New York, 1927, P• 1
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They do not appear to have acquired the function of issuing
8

bank notes .
Ba,ckgroung, Q.f Modern Banking
Dutch Contribution:
Shortly after the formation of the Dutch India Company in
1620, Holland became a world center of trade .

To handle the

hetrogenerous lot of light weight coins received by the Dutch
traders from all parts of the world, and to help finance t he
extensive foreign trade of the country, the Bank of Amsterdam,
9

a municipal institution, was established in 16o9.
Thi s bank accepted coins of many varieties and various
degrees of reliability, many worn, defaced, and clipped; it
tested them, weighed them, credited the depositor on its
books with the value of the metal they contained and gave
the depositor a receipt or certificate for them.

These

certificates passed from person to person and served as a
sort of circulating medium.

They were redeemn.ble at the bank

in the metal they represented through the payment of a small
fee or premium.

In this way the bank became one of the
10
earliest banks of issue .

8

Ibid , p . 4
9

Ibid , p . 2f:!7
10
·l illiam B. Weeden, Economic and Social History of Uew England,
Boston, 1890 , P• 36o
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The Bank of Amsterdam was more like an essay office than
a modern bank.

The deposits came to be kno,,m as ban_'tc money,

and could be transferred from one holder to another by the
process of a written order or check on the bank.
similar bank was established in Hamburg .
called

11

giro 11 or 11 exchangen banks .

In 1619 a

These banks were

They were created for

the sole purpose of' providing a sound and stable currency by
means of which trade could be facilitated and promoted .

To

a very considerable extent, by providing a sound and stable
standard of value, the banks were instrumental in making
11
Amsterdam and Hambury financial and commercial centers .
The sole source of income of the Bank of Amsterdam was
a substantial charge or fee which the bank levied on each
denosit rnade by a new depositor , and an additional charge for
each subsequent deposit for safe keeping .

The bunk did not

profess to lend out any or the deposits but to retain in its
coffers the actual specie or bullion de,osited .

Houever

temptation p:.~oved too strong and within half a century the
bank violated its charter by allowinc considerable overdrafts

and by lending its coin and bullion reserve .

'.-./hen the

,:!a st

India Conpany failed in 1794, the bank had to be liquidated.
11
Conant, .QE• ill•, p . 171
12
Ibid, p . 177

12
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Italian Contribution:
Contribut ion to banking by the Italians included the development of the deposit function and the making of loans for both
consumptive and productive ,urposes on the security of mortgaees ,
bank deposits , and specie .

Through the discount ?rocess , bills

of exchance, which were in coIDI!lon use during the later middle
ages as credit instruments , became a means for advances to
comnercial interests .

The bill of exchange , originally a

currency instrument was that their use concealed the collection
of interest .

The Italians developed new forms of credit , partly

from business neces ~ity and partly to circumvent the prohibition

13
of the church.

Nodern bank checks and notes were not used .

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the r outes
trade chaneed .
ranean to the

of

Commercial supremacy passed from the Meditertlantic countries to .;.'..urope .

As this took place

financial power passed gradually to northern ::Jurope .

Gr eat

financial houses such as the Fuggers of Augusb y and the
~Ielser greu up and doi::tlnoted the poli tices and finances of
European states .

The business af banking however, wns only a

14

branch of the affairs of these great financial houses .

13

Sir John Claphara, The ~ .Qi .England, New York, Hacmillan
Company, 1945, p . 576

14

Conant,

• _ill., p . 651
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CF..APTER III
THE INFLUZNC:3 OF THE ZUROP::tJ~ B CKGROUND

nr

on

B 'iNKrnG

'!'HE UNITZD STATES DURING THE

19th CEUTURY
~ ~

QI Zn.gland Influence

The earliest banks in this country are part and parcel
in structure ancl function as the Bank of England.

This fact

is shoim in one of the earliest banks on record, namely, the
1

bank of !forth America , founded in 1782.

The same principles ,

for the most part , are reflected in the First Bank of the
United States , the Second Bank of the United States and in
the National Bank which followed in chronological order.
~

.Qf. Nor.th America :

Several banks were in operation prior to the beginning
of the 19th century, notably among which was the Bnnk of
North America

'

organized under the leadership of Robert Horris ,
2

and chartered by the Continental Congres s on January 7, 1782.
The bank opened for business in Philadelphia , Pennsylvania
1

'-lal ter W. J ennings , ! History _Q! ""'conomic Progress in ~
Uni ted States, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Hew York : 1926
p . 198

2

Ibid., p . 308
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the sane year .
The Bank of Horth Anerica had an authorized capitalization of Jl0, 000, 000 and , of this amount only 070, 000 was
subscribed to by the public .

Only a 0200, 000 cash sub-

scription (in specie) by the Continental Congress itself
saved the bank from failure before operat ion could commence .

3

Although the stock in the bank was held by the Continental Congress for the most part, - $200 ,000 of the $270 , 000
paid in capital stock - the Continental Congress turned over
the administration of the bank to private banks .

This

private control of banking was a plhlicy practiced by the
4

Bank of England, the founders of the Bank of lforth America .
First~ Qi.~ United States :
Four years after the signing of the Constitution,
Alexander Hamilton, Secr etary of the Treasury under President
George .Tashington, succeeded in pushing through Congress a

bill to charter the first Bank of the United States .

It

5
opened its doors to the public on December 12, 1791.
3
Eugene E. Am; er, Organized Banking , Henry Holt and Company,
New York : 1918, p . 215
4
Frederic A. Bradford, Bankil1g , Longmans , Green and Company,
New York : 1932, p. 52

5

Ibig., p . 83

-16-

Hamil ton I s main argl.mlents in support of the institution
6

were:
1.

The demonstrated success and usefulness of national

banks in the chief European Countries .
2.

The more effective utlization of capital by concen-

trating the savings of the cormnunity for business uses .

3.

The possible services of such a bank to the govern-

ment in advancing loans and facilitating the payment of taxes .

4. The servability of a bank note currency. The opposition t o the scheme was led by Madison and came from the
southern states.
The law provided for a Bank of the United States, located
at Philadelphis , capitalized ~t

C10,ooo,ooo,

with shares at

$400 each, subscriptions payable one-fourth in specie and
three-fourth in United States securities bearing 6,ltinterest
and payable within two years .

The United States 6overnment

subscribed ~~2, 000, 000 , which sum was loaned by the bank to the
government, the loan to be repaid in ten annual installments .
Thus the i:ayment of the government subscription was effected
by what were virtually s t ock notes - a very faulty banking
operation.

The subscriptions in government securities were

thought to give the bank a wider basis for note issue than
6

Bradford,

QQ. •

cit ., P• 60
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would ot herwise have been possible, it being diff icult to
assemble C10, ooo, ooo in gold.

7

The bank was privately controlled by a board of directors
of 25 members , not more than three- fourths of whom were eligible f or re- election.

Stockholders in foreign countries could

not vote by pro:xy and t he directors had to be citizens of the
United States .

The votes al lowed per share decreased with

the increase in t he number of shares held by any one stockholder , thus providing for decentralized control, and no
subscription, save that of the government, was to exceed 1 ,000
8

shares .
The bank was organized to perform. the following fiscal
9

and banking services :

(1) to provide a sound and elastic

currency for the United States; (2) to act as depository for
government funds ; (3 ) to provide the bullion needed by the mint
for coinage purposes ; (4) to transfer government funds without
serious effect upon the money market ; (5) to prevent
excessive issue of sta t e bank notes , by putting pressure upon
institutions issuing notes for cing t hem to meet certain
7

Charles A. Conant, A Hist or;y;: of l odern ~ ,Q,f Issue , G. P.
Putam' s Sons , New York : 1915, P• 336

8

H. Parker Willis and George W. Edua1·ds , Bsinking sm.d Busines§,
Harper and Brothers , New York : 1922, P• 290

9

Ibid., p . 291
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requirements if the Bank of the United States was to redeem
these notes; and (6) to act as the fiscal agent of the
government , which meant primarily that it was to loan funds
to the new government .
The bank was well mnnaged and successful t hroughout;
it served definite needs both for the government and the
people, and paid its own way.

It is hard to believe that

Congress could have refused to renew its charter; yet, that
is just what happened.

Many arguments were advanced against

the bank, on Constitutional and other grounds , but the real
reason why the charter was not renewed was a sort of nameless
public fear that too much monetary power was concentrated in
one place .
Upon liquidation the stockholders received 434 for each
10
$400 share held.
Second Bank of~ United States:
As a result of the disordered state of banking and public
finance as well as losses to the government and business interests from price inflation stemming from excessive bank
note issue, Congress , on April 10, 1916, adopted the proposal
of President l.fadison and established, over the opposition of
10

J. Marvin Peterson and D.R. Cawthorne, Money W,d Banking,
The Hacmillian Company, New York: 1949, P• 101
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Daniel ilebster the Second Banlc of the Uni ted States .

11

Although larger , the bank was similar in organizati on to
its predecesnor.

Its charter was much more el abor ate and

detailed.
Like its predecessor, the new bank was given a twentyyear charter .

The authorized capital of the bank was ~35

millions , of which one fifth was taken by the government
and the balance was sold to the public on the installment
12
plan.
The government was permitted to pay for its stock in
specie or on its own promise to pay, bearing 5% interest .
The government used the second method; its note was not
fully paid until 1831 .

One- f ourth of the public subscription
13

was payable in specie end the balance in government securities.
The government was given a franchise tax of $1 , 500, 000
for granting the charter and also the right t o appoint five
of the twenty- five director s ; and ot her directors were to be
stockholders residing in the United States .

Congress was

11
Freder ic A. Bradford, Banking , Longman ' s Green and Company,
New York : 1932, p . 57
12
Tillis and lliwards , .Q!2.• cit . p . 394
13
J . Marvin Peterson and D. R. Cawthorne , Money: and Banking ,
The :V.1.acroilli am Company, New York : 1949 , p . 104
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given authority to eY..amine the bnnk .

14

The note is sue of the Second Bank was based upon its
general assets ani limited to the amount of its authorized
capital .

No note was to be issued of a denomination smaller

than <.;>5.00 .

11 deposits as well as rotes were to be redeemed

in specie, and a charge of 12 per cent per annum could be

collected by note holders if the bank failed to redeem its
15
notes in specie on demand.
The bank was to act as fiscal agent of the government
in transferring and disbursing public funds .

Moreover, the

bank was to provide means of transporting these funds to all
places in the United States without cost to the government.

In partial compensation for the services provided the
government, the Treasury agreed to keep its surplus funds on
deposit with the bank.

mu.le the bank was forbidden to

purchase public funds, it could loan $500,000 to the government
16
with the authorization of Congress .
The bank established twenty- five brancl tds , thus greatly
facilitating the collection, safekeeping , and disbursement of
government funds .
14Luther Harr and w. Carlton Harris , Banking Theory .fil}Q.. Practice,
lcGraw- Hill Book ompany, New York: 1936, P• 392
15
Peterson and Cawthorne , .Qll• cit . , P• 102

16
Harr and Harris , Ibid, p. 393
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The Second United States Bank, under the able direction
of Langdon Cheves and Nicholas Biddle, rendered a real
service to the nation.

Unfortunately for its future , the

question of its recharter around the latent hostility between the debi tor and democratic :lest and the more conservative creditor :Ust.

Andrew Jackson, true son of the

·T est, feared the bank as a dangerous monopoly pcejudicial
to the interests of the co

on man, and became convinced

that Biddle and his associates were using the vast power of
17
the bank to nlay politics .

In his first message Jackson questioned both the constitutionality and expendience of the bank, but committees
in both the House and Senate reported favorably upon it .
The supporters of Henry Clay (candidate of the National
Republican prty in 1832) , scenting a political is sue which
they believed would carry them to victory in 1832, prevailed
upon the bank to petition for the renewal of the charter
four years before the existing charter expired, and Biddle ,
convinced that such a move would be successful, did so .
Jackson vetoed the bill ; the question of the bank was made
an issue in the presidential election of 1832, and the
victory of the Democrats spelled the doom of the bank .

In

an effort to frighten the nation into support of the bank ,

D

Hi
Harold Underwood Faulkner, American Economic
story.
Harper and Brothers , New York: 1949, P• 164
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Biddle, in 1833, ordered a contraction of loans and produced
a credit stringency lmown as

11

Biddle 1 s Panic" .

Instead of

accomplishing the desired result , he merely convinced the
people that Jackson was right and that the powers of the
bank were dangerous to the nation.

Jackson fought back by

refusing to remove two Secretaries of the Treasury before
he could find one who would follow this policy, but in the
end he dealt staggering blows to bank before its charter
18

expired in 1836.
State

~

Growth and .R_eforms

With the failure to recharter the Second Bank of the
United States the Federal Government withdrew from any
supervision of the nation ' s banking until the creation of the
National Banking System in 1863 .

From 1$36 to 1863, the

United States had no national banks , banking operations being
performed by state chartered banks and private banks .

Because

of the dismal picture presented by state banking before the
Civil Har, this period has been called by some the 11 Dark Age"

19
of American banking.

18
Faullmer, .2D.• cit., p . 165
19
Fundamentals of Banking , American Institute of Banking ,
New York : 1943 , p . 8
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Types Qi. State Banks :
(1)

Hldcat Banks :

In the west and in the south, places

of redemption were often mam tained in almost inaccessible
and obscure areas in t..lie wilds where wildcats were more numerous
than persons .

This "banking among the wildcats" led to tho ex20
pression "wildcat banking" .
Because there was no uniformity of design, note is:mes
were easily counterfeited .

In many cases , since it was difficult

to ascertain if a bank rad failed , notes of failed banks circulated long after the demise of the bank .

Because of the risk in-

volved, the notes of state banks were received with considerable
reluctance .

The person to whom notes were tendered in payment

for goods or services had ~o find out , if possible , if the
issuing bank was still in business , and if so, whether or not
it redeemed its notes in species , and whether the notes circulated at par or at a discount, and the amount of t he discount .

(2)

Pet Banks :

The selection o_ State banks to hold funds

of the government was made with care , although there were nany
heated charges that the choice was made solely on political
grounds; J ackson ' s 11pet 11 banks became one of ":,he catch words of
22
a party campaigning .
20
Dewey, .Qll• _ill., p . 10

21
Ibid ., p . 12
22
Br adford , .Ql2.• cit., p . 61 ·

21
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At this time , collateral could be called for , If the
Secretary of the Treasury deemea it advisable, and must be given
if the deposits e;:ceeded one-half of a bank's capital; weekly
returns of the condition of the ban..1{ were required and the
bank must be open to examination at any time .
Economcal arrangements were also made as ta the transfer
of public moneys from one place to the other, and for the sale
of bills of exchange of London in the final settlement of the
public indebtedness held abroad.

The whole matter carefully

defining the authority of the government and the obligations of
the banks was finally covered by the act af June 23 , 1936,
23
"regulating the deposits of public money" .
It was then laid down that any bank employed as a depository should credit as specie all sums deposited to the credit
of the United States, and that no bank should be selected which
did not redeem its notes in specie or which issued any note of
a denomination less than five dollars .

It was further provided

that, if the deposit execeeded a fourth part of the bank 's
capital for at least three months , the bank should pay 2% interest on the excess deposit.

Apparently the interests af the

24
government were well safeguarded.
23

Ibid., p . 62
24

Luther Harr and W. Carlton Harris, Banking Theory and
Practices, HcGraw-Hill, New York: 1936, P• 393
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(3)

State Owned Banks :

Banks oimed either wholly or in

part by the state were organized in several sections of the
country .

Some, such as the State Bank of Indiana , were well

managed and operated successfully.

Others , such as the banks

established by 11ississippi , Arkansas , Flordia , and Kentucky
were political banks , badly managed, and ended in disaster .
Most banks m-med and operated by the states were unsuccessful
because of bad management , unsound banking policies , and pol-

25
itical corruption.
Privat e banking at its worst has never , even at this late
day, approached the cepths of banking abuses , infamy, and fraud
plumbing by some of these state banks .

Important contributions

to .American banking , however , were made by some of the states ,

26

particularly Indiana , Louisiana , and Ohio .

Craig ...,t ~ Al . v The Stat e .Qf. Nissouri - 4 Peters 410 - 1830
Writ of error to the Supr eme Court of the State of Missouri.

This case concerned the constitutionality of an act of

the legislature of i ssiouri, 27 June , 1921, to establish loan
offices which were empowered to issue certificates t o the

25

Willis and Edwards ,

.QJ2. •

ill•,

P• 401

26
Ibid ., p . 4D3
De I. R. Banks Library
_ . ~
Vi A A. & ~ - Colle1•
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amount of two hundred thousand dollars , which certificates were
to be receivable at the treasury of the State of 1-Iissouri in
discharge of taxes or debts due to the State and by all officers in the State in discharge of salaries and fees of offices .

In Craig v issouri, decided :in 1830, the Supreme Court
was for the first time called upon to determine squarely what
constitutes a "bill of credit" within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition.

In this case was questioned the power

of the 8tate to issue :interest-bearing certificates , not declared legal tender, but receivable at the treasury or debts
but to the State .

Certa:in property of the State was pledged to

their redemption, and the governor was authorized to negotiate
a loan of silver or sold for the same ? urpose .

These certifi-

cates, the Supreme Court held to be bills of credit, and, as
such, illegally emitted .

In his opinion Marshall said : "To

' emit bills of credit ' conveys to the mind the idea of issuing
paper int

ded to circulate through the community for its

ordinary purposes , as money, which paper is redeemable at a

28
future day11 •
Brisco v Bank of Kentuclcr: 11 Peters 257, 1837:
27

Comm.ager, Documents of .American History, P• 257

28

-lestel u. Willoughby, Princiules of the Constitutional 1ID!_
of the United States , Balcer , Voorhis and Company, 1938,
p. 506

27
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The court held the case of Brisco v . Bank of Kentucky, that
the bank of Kentucky, unlike the case of Craig v . The State of
Missouri - the Bank of Kentucky was not a bank owned exclusively by the State of Kentucky, but the Bank of Kentucky was merel y
';?!)

an institution in which the stat e held stock .
Toney held that in the case of Kentucky, these notes
(bills of credit) wa.s not circulating on the faith of the state
but they were circulating on the faith of a bank (Kentucky) in
which the bank held stock .

But , - continued Justice Toney, the

bank held stock, does not mean even by :L~plications that the
State of Kentucky had imparted to the bank of Kentucky any of
30

the Stat e of Kentucky ' s solvency.
Bank of Augusta v . Earles: 13 Peters 519, 1839

In the case of the Bank of Augusta v • .Earles which involved
also the power of a state ovmed bank to emit bills of credit or
bank notes , the court held that the r i ght to is rue bank notes
was a connnon law occupation open to all men which the state, not
the Federal Government, might restrain, if it saw fit .

'lb.is

implied that the right to govern and cont rol b nk note issues
was within itself not a monopolistic right of the Federal

29
Ibi£.., p . 506
30

Ibid ., p . 507
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Government but, could be controlled even by states .
l- easures . .Qf

31

Reform

The Suffolk System :
The soundness of state banks depended mainly on the safeguarded provided by the states .

As early as 1809, Massachusetts

imposed a penalty of 2 per cent a ::nonth upon banks which failed
to redeem their notes on demand , and all banks incorporated
after 1829 were required to limit their note issue to an mount
not in excess of one and one- fourth times their capital .
As Boston was the commercial and the financial center of
New ~gland , bank notes from outside areas were prc:;cntcd to
the businessmen and b~nks of Boston in paynont. of purchases .
The notes tended to circulate in Boston at a di '.1 c01mt, the
a~ount of discount varying because of the ~i f ficulty of
sending tho notes to the issuing bank for redemption .
notes of the Boston banlcs circulated at

r:a r .

The

The Boston

bmiks found that the cheaper notes of the outs ide banks tended
to drive their ot.m notes out of circulation, and they fina.:..ly
rcnedied -'·he situation with the establishment of the Suffolk
System in 1824.

32

31
Hilloti.ghbv, on . _c it ., p . 507

32

"
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Brndford, .92. cit., p . 68
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In the same year , the Suffolk Bank entered into an agreement
with the other six banks of Boston to act as a collection a 8ency
for the notes received on out- of- tmm banks .

The Suffolk Bank,

in turn entered into arrangements with the other New :Jngland
banlcs to redeem their notes in Boston at par , provided these
banks could maintain a deposit of 02, 000 or more , without interest, with the Suffolk Bank, in addition to a sum sufficient
to redeeo their notes .

By lending these deposits , the Suffolk

Bank would receive an income sufficient to pay the expenses of
33
operating the acency.

If a bank refused to join the system, the Suffo2.k Bank hnd
the unpleasant habit of gathering up the notes of the recalcitrant, somet:ines to t he embrasement of the issuing bank.

This

practice hod the effect of forcing most of the h nks in New
•

England states into the system.

As a result of the Suffolk System, the discount on note
issues was eliminated .

It improved the credit standing of the

banks and it reduced the hazards of conducting business .

The

Suffolk System exercised some of t he functions associated ri th
central banlcing .

It provided a clearing mechanism, de eloping

a method of note redenption analogous to the check collection
system of the Federal Reserve banks of today .

33

It brought about

Weldon ,ielfling, !-:one;:: and Banldng , American rnstitute of
Banking, New York : 1953, P• 120
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some concentration of bank reserves .

The system was efficiently

and profitably operated and continued to function until the Civil
34
Har .
The Safety~ System:

In an attempt to protect bank creditors from loss r esulting
from Bank failures , the New York State legislature , in 1829,
adopted the Safety Fund System, a form of mutual guarantee
fund out of which the creditors of failed banks were to be paid .

35
Host of the bank charters were expiring that year .
Under this law, each new or rechartered bank was required
to pay to the treasury of the state each year an amount equal
to one- half of one per cent of its capital stock until 3 per
cent had been paid into the fund .

Further assessments up to

one-half of one per cent of their capital stock could be l evi ed
each year on solvent banks as the f und became depleated .

If,

after liquidation, the assets of failed banks rere insufficient
to pay the bank ' s creditors , the deficiency wa s to be paid out
36
of t he fund .
The Safety Fund System operated successfully for a number
3L~

Welfling , 9ll.• ill•, p . 121

35

The Supply and Control of Money .i!l t he United
States ~rwd University Press , Cambridge , 1935,
( 2d ed '. rev. ) , p . 387

L. B Curr 1· e

36

Ibiq.,

p.

389
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of years when bank failures were small in mnnber, but when bank
failures increased rapidly following the panic of 1837, the
fund was inadequate .
The Safety Fund System was defective in two respects: (1)
it applied to all creditors of the banks , note halders and depositors alike , instead of being limited to the prompt payment
of the notec of insolvent banks , and (2) it based contributions
to the fund on capital stock instead of notes in circulation.
Although not holders and depositors are both creditors of a
bank, note holders require greater protection since they are
involuntary creditors .

They cannot be expected to inquire
37
into the solvency of a bank before accepting its notes .
Free Banking:
Before 1838, bank charters in New York were granted by
a special act of the state legislature .

In many cases bank

charters were granted as a form of political patronage .

Those

who were succensful in obtaining a charter were looked upon as
monopolists , the recipients of special privileges .

s a

result of the abuse and corruption attendant upon securing a
charter, there arose a presist-nt demand for a more democratic

TI

E

.

Stephen Enke and Virgil Salera , International ·conon:1.c§,
Prentice- Hall , New York : 1947, P• 86
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method of granting bank charters .

38

In 1838 the New York legislature enacted the Free Banking
Act, so called because it permitted any person or association
of persons with sufficient dapital and other qualifications to
establish a bank and to issue circulating notes upon deposit
with a designated state official of an equal amount of bonds
to the United States , New York or other approved states, or
mortages on real estate worth double the amount of the real
39
property and bearing interest at not less than 6%.
Many new banks were organized under the fr ee banking
system, many for the sole purpose of issuing notes .

The Free

Banking System provided a safe but inelastic note issue •
.ll:;w. Independent Treasury: System:

The expiration of the charter of the Second Bank of the
United States and the subsequent increase in the number of
badly financed state banks caused such widespread losnes that

Congress was forced in 1846 to establish the Independent
Treasury System for the :::,rotection of the funds of the govern40
ment .
38
Raymond p. Kent , Mone,Y ane Banking,, Rienhart & Com iaey,
New York : 1947, P• 244
39

Ibi5i. , p . 245
40

An act that called for the establishment of on independent

treasury was passed in 1840, but this was repealed one
year later .
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Under this system, the Federal Government acted as its m,m
bank, that is, it collected revenues in the Treasury in ~foshington and in ::ru.btreasuries located in various cities, and made
disbursements from these offices.

No fis cal agent or deposit-

ories were employed by the government from 1846 to 1863, when
the National Bank Act permitted the Treasury to use the national
banks as depositories of its funds .

Moreover , the Treasury re-

fused to accept the notes issued by state banks; the Treasury
41
therefore operated exclusively on a specie basis .
Under the Independent Treasury System, the Treasury becane
a major factor in the money market.

On tax dates, funds were

transferred to the Treasury from the individual b· nks, with a
result in6 money market .

The short-term rate of interest would

soar to great heights fo r a short time and then return to
normal levels as t he funds were spent by the goverDilent and
thus again became availabl e to the individual banks .

These

disturbances in the money market caused the Treasury, after
the National Banking System was establ ished, to use the nation.al banks as depositories of Treasury funds .

et t he

Treasury had full power to select whate .ier ru:i t i onal banks it
it might choose to use or to depos i t funds in the subtreasuries
as it pleased .

4l

The availability of funds in t 1-'e ""'oney mar::et

Peterson and Cawthorne , ml· cit .,

• 108
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as a whole or in sectors of it could, therefore, be altered
by Treasury actions, which might create either stability or
42
instability in the money market .
Finally, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 authorized the
Federal Reserve bcnks to act as fiscal agents and depositories
for federal monies, which functions they performed so efficiently that the Independent Trea sury System was discontinued
43
by action of Congress in 1920.
~ National Banking System in the United States
~

National Bank Act:

Structure~ Operation:

After considerable opposition on the part of sta ~e banks
and opponents of banking offices of any kind chartered by the
Federal Government, an act providing for the establishment of
a national banking system was passed by a narrow margin of
votes by Congress, which act became effective on February 25 ,
1863 .

It is significant that the National Banking

ct of

1863 was entitled 11 an Act to provide a National Currency,
secured by the pledge of United States stocks (bonds)_, and
provide for the circulation and redemption t here of" .

This

42
Cyril F. James , The Economics of Honey, Credit, and Bankin",
New York : The Roland Press ,1940, p . 248 (3rd . ed . )
43
lal ter -lyatt, "Federal Banking Legislation", &nkin~
Studies , Board of Governors , 1941, PP• 39- 40
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title indicates that the dominant motive of the act concerns
the note-issuing function of banks rather than the bank credit

41..,
or bank deposit function .
The banking act of 1863 was so defective that it was
replaced in i t s entirety by a new act which became effective
on June 3, 1864.

The chief provisions of this act may be

summarized as follows:
1.

45

The act provided for a separate bureau of the Trea-

sury department, the chief of which was to be kno,m as the
comptroller of the currency, and was to have general supervision over the National Banking Syst em.
The Comptroller is appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate for a five- year term.

As

the supervi sor of the nati onal banking syst em, he has much
authority with r espect to the organization, operation, and
liquidation of t hese commercial banks which operate under
federal charters .

e grants charters to newly organized

national banks , approves the conversion of state banks int o
national institutions , and passes upon the consolida t ion of

44
Horace White, Honey~ Banking , Ginn and Company, Boston:
1937, p . 176

45

H. Parker ill is and John M. Chapman, ~ Banking Si tuation,
Columbia University Press , 1934, p . 52
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two or more national banks as well as the consolidation of
national banks , changes in their capitalization, and the
issurance of capital notes and deventures .

His approval

must be obtained for the opening change of location, and

46
closing of branches of national banks .
The amount af capital st~ck required for the organization of a national bank varies with the size of the town or
city in which it was located.

The minimum capital require-

ments provided by the Act were v50 ,000 in cities of not over
6,000 inhabitants; $100 , 000 in cities of 6, 000 to 50 , 000

ihhabitants .

47
48

Percentage of Deposits Required to be Held as
Reserves by National Banks ; 1887-1913
Group A
Central Reserve
City Banlcs
Total required reserve . 25%

.....

In own vaults

25%

Group B
Reserve City
Banks

25%

Group C
All Other
Banks

15%

6%

Redeposited :

In group

A banks .

In group A or group
B banks • • • •

9%

46
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Jeaknesses:
The main defects of the National Banking System may be
summarized as follows :
1.

49

Scattered Reserves :

The Commission pointed out that

there was no provision under the existing banking system for
the cash reserves of the banks and for their mobilization and
use whenever needed in time of trouble .

Experience had sh01-m

that the scattered reserves of the banks were inadequate for
assist<.lnce or defense at time of need .
2.

Pyramiding of Reserves :

A large portion of the free

reserves of county banks tended to graviate to New York .
Country banks were free to deposit three fifths of their reserves in approved national banks in reserve or central reserve
cities .

They were under complusion to do so since balances kept

in these national banks received 2 per cent interest, where as
if they were held in their ovm vaults, they would receive no
interest what ever .

3.

The same was true of reserve cit y banks .

Inelasticity of National Bank Notes :

Another defect

of the National Banking System was the inelasticity of the
national bank notes whi ch supplied the major curr ency needs of
the country .

The failure of national bank notes to expand and

dontrast in volume , in accordance with the varying needs of
49
Louis A. Rufener, -oney fil!S Banking _i!! the Uni ted States,
Houghton Miff lin Company, 1934, Chapter VII
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industry and commerce for money, wa s due to a number of reasons.

The fact that national bank notes were issued upon

the security of government bonds set a rigid upper limit on
the amount of notes that could be is sued .
Another factor that tended to make national bank notes
inelastic was the limitation on the amount of notes which a
bank could legally is sue .

Under t,he terms of the National

Bank Act, banks were limited in their issues to the amount of
50
their capital.
The national bank note i Gsues were also devoid of seasonal and emergency elasticity.

4. Inelasticity of Bank Credit: The bank credit was
compara t ively inelastic .

Once a bank loaned up to the legal

limit there was no possibility of further loan expansion.

There

was no means of rediscounting eligivle commercial paper with a
central bank , nor was there the semblance of a discount market
which would permit national banks to expand their deposit credit.
5.

No Domestic Clearing System:

The National Banking

System was defective in that there was no eff ective agency covering the entire count ry which afforded the necessary facilities
for making domestic exchanges between different localities and
sections .

50
Fred A. Shannon, Ame_·ica 1 s Economic Growth, The Macmillan
Company, 1940, ·J . 49
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6. Foreign Exchange Difficulties: National banks were not
permitted to establish branches abroad, nor were they permitted
by law to accept drafts originating from foreign trade.
7.

No protection of the Nation's Gold Reserve:

51

There was

no instrumentality or agency charged with the responsibility of
influencing the foreign exchange or the export or inl9ort of
gold.

There was no agency which could operate in the foreign

exchange market with a view to influencing the rates, or which
could anticipate gold movements, and effectively control the
market at home.

The country lacked an agency which could

control and defend the external value of the national monetary
unit.

8.

Other Defects:

In addition to the defects which have

been noted, the Commission drew attention to a number of other
short-comings of the banking system.

There was no standardized

commercial paper available for investments by banks, resulted
in the movement of surplus funds and excessive reserves from
all sections of the country to New York where it was loaned out
on call on stock exchange securities.
There was no agency with power to enforce the adoption of
uniform. standards with respect to capital, reserves, reports, or
examinations.

51
Shannon, .Q.ll• cit., p. 68
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The banking system lacked a controlling agency to assume
responsibil ity for the system as a whole, to regulate credit
and currency in the best interests of the economic life of the
52
nation.
Although the structures of many historians on the state
banks concerning their note issues and other banking practices
in this period doubtless are justified, an equally severe

cdnsure befits the failures of Congress to apprehend the ~one-

tary needs of the nation and to meet those needs with an adequate supply of a sound currency.

11any communities were al-

together dependent for a supply of a medium of exchange on the
bad note issues of the state banks.

When, at last, Congress

imposed a tax on these note issues (1867) that drove them from
circulation, the national bank note, authorized by the National
Bank Act of 1863, became the only bank notes in circulation
for a period of almost fifty years .

In this same period (1863-

1913), controversy over t he coinage of silver resulted in no
satisfactory solution to the money problem.

Owing in part to

the failure to provide the economy with an adequate supply of
good money, the nation suffered a long period of falling "Jrices

(1865-1897).
52

W.

o.

Although sone alleviation of this condition was

Scrog"'s , A Century of Banking Progress. Doubleday-Doran,
New York: 1924, pp . 76-77
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accidentally furnished by new discoveries of gold in wi dely
separated areas of the world, which resulted in a greater supply
of monetary gold, only temporarily were the demands for monetary
and banking reform stilled.
The Panic of 1907 was largely responsible for the renewal
of these demands .

The result was the passage of the Federal

Re serve Act which became law on December 23 , 1913 .

53
Peterson and Cawthorne , .QR• cit ., pp . 123- 130
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CHAPI'ZR IV

STRUC'I'URE ND FUNCTION OF TH:2: FEDiIBAL RS3ERVE SYSTEM
Structure Qf

~

Federal Reserve System

In consideration of the System ' s structure , attention
will be given first to the Board of Governors .
Board .Q.f. Governors :
Selection and Term of Hembers :

The Board of Governors of

the Federal Resei~e System is a governmental institution with
offices in ·w ashington, D. C.

It consists of seven members

appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed
by the Senate .

Members devote their full time to the business

of tl.e Board and are appointed for terms of fourteen years .
No two members of the Board may come from the s~me Federal Reserve district .

The Board rs expenses are paid out of assess-

ments upon the Reserve Banlcs , and the Board ' s accounts are
1

audited each year by qualified public accountants .
Powers and Functions .Qf the Boa rd of Governors :

One of

the Board ' s duties is to supervise the operations of the
Federal Reserve System.

The Board appoints three of the

1

The Federal Reserve System - Its Purposes and Function,
Board of Governors , Hashington, D. C.: 1954, P• 77
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nine directors of each Federal Reserve Banlc, including the Chairman, who is also 'jhe Federal Reserve Agent , and the Deputy
Chairman .

Appointments of the President and Vied President of

each Federal Reserve Banlc are subject to the Board's approval .
The Board also issues regulations that interpret the provisions
of law relating to Reserve Bank operations .

It directs the

System ' s activities in bank examination and supervision and
2

coordinates its economic research and publications .
The Board represents the Federal Reserve System in mos~ of
its relations with executive deµrtments of the Government and
with congressional conn:nittees .

It is required to exerc.i.se

special supervision over foreign contacgs and international
operations of the Reserve Banks .

The Chairman of the Board is

a member of the National Advi sory Council on International
·,onetary and Financial Problems .

The Board submits and annual

report to Congress and publishes we kly a statement required

.3
by law of the assets and liabilities of the Federal Reserve Banlcs .

One of the principal monetary actions of t he Federal Reserve ,
the Boa r d has full authority over changes in reserve requirements .
It also

11

reviews and determines 11 di::icount rates established b~r the

2
3

The Federa]. Reserve System, op . cit., p . 7o

H. Parker :Jillis, The Federal Reserve Sys tem, New York : The
Ronald Press Compm.y, 192.3, p . 106
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directors of the Reserve Banks .

The me::abers of the Boord are

members of the Federal Cpen Earket Comnittee, described next,
and constitute a majority of that important body .

The Board

hos responsibility for the determination of selective regulation of stock market credit and , for limited periods , has
responsibility for regulating consumer credit and real estate
credit .

It has authority to establish the maximum rates of

interest tha~ member banks may pay on savings and other time
deposits .

In general, the Board of Governors is largely res-

ponsible for formulating national credit policies and for
4
supervising their e::ecution.
Federal~ Larket Committee :
This Committee comprises the seven members of the Board
of Governors and five representatives elected by the Federal
Reserve Banks .

It has responsibility for deciding on changes

to be made in the system ' s portfolio of Government securities in other words, when and how much to buy or sell in the open
market and under what conditions .

The Reserve Banks, in their

operations in the open market, are required by law· to carry out
5
the decisions of the Open l.farket Comnittee .
4
Feder:sl. Reserve Bulletin, March 1953 , p • .32
5
E. A. Goldenweiser, 11 Public Nature of the Reserve Banks 11 ,
Banking Studies , Board of Governors , 19LiJ. , P. 2.39
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The Federal Open Market Committee meets in ·rashington four
times a year, or oftener if necessary, and reviews the national
business and credit situation with the help of its staff, which
is drawn from the staffs of the Board of Governors and t .. e Reserve Banks .

In meeting; of the Corrnnittee , representatives of

the Reserve Banks bring to the table special knowledge of regional conditions .

Decisions about open market policies are

made in the light of a full discussion of national and region6

al factors .
Purchnses and sales of securities for the Federal Open
Harket Committee are effected in the mme of the System located
among the twelve Federal Re,.,erve Banks in accordance with the
ratio of each Reserve Bank ' s total assets to the total assets
for all Reserve Banks combined .

All transactions are super-

vised by the Manager of the Account , who is an officer of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Such transactions are required
7

to be in accordance with instructions issued by the Committee .
Federal

dviso:c,y Council:

The Federal Reserve Act Jrovides for a Federal Advisory
Council of twelve members, one from each Federal Reserve
6
7

·lillis ,

.Q.!2. .

cit . p . 189

Carl E. Perry, ""Tork of the Board of Governors" , Bankin.17.
Studies , Washington! Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 1941, p . 358
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district, selected anually by the Federal Reserve Bank through
its board of directors .

Council members are usually selected

from among representative bankers in each district .

The

council meets in /ashington at least four times a year .

It

confers with the Board of Governors on business conditions and
makes advisory recom.~endations regarding the affairs of the
Federal Reserve System.

It constitutes a link between the
8

Board and representatives of bankin~ in the twelve districts .
Federal Reserve Banks :

In accordance with the provisions of the Federal Reserve
Act the country was divided into twelve districts and a Federal
Reserve bank was set up in each district .

The basis of the divi-

sion of the count ry was not territorial rquality but rather the
establishm.0nt of Reserve banks at points where they could serve
best the b~nking needs of the country.
The twelve Federal Reserve banks and their branches are
essentially banker ' s banks •

...:.ach Reserve bank is a corporation

operating under an indeterminate charter and all its capital
stock is oi-med by the individual banks of its districts which
have come into and have beca::ie nembers of the Federal Reserve
9
System.
8

Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 1953, p . 79
9

The Federal Reserve System, op . cit ., P• 71
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Capitalization of tho Federal Reserve Banks :

The Federal

Reserve Act provided that no reserve bank might be established
with a capital of less than ~4, 000 , 000, divided into shares of
$100 per value .

National banks \Tere required , and state banks ,

trust companies , and mutual savings banks are permitted to subscribe to the capital stock of the Federal Reserve Bank of
their district and become member banks of the Federal Reserve
10
System.
fuen a bank becomes a member, it is required to subscribe
a

Sllill

equal to 6 per cent of its capital and surplus to the

stock of the Feder al Reserve Bank.

If the stock of the Reserve

Bank is increased or decreaded, its subscription to the stock
of the Reserve Bank is increased or decreased to confirm to
changes in its capital and surpl us .

Only half of the subscri-

ptions t o Federal Re serve bank stock has been paid in .
balance is subject to call.

The

In view of the adequate r esources

which Federal Re serve Banks have at the present time it oppears
11
improbable that the unpaid balance will be called .
The capital account of each Federal Re serve Bank varies
with changes in the number of member banks in its district
and with increases in the capital or surplus ai'the member
10

.AnnusJ.
11

Reports , Board of Governora of the Federal Re serve
System, ,Tashington : 1953, P• 41

Ibid ., p . 43

-48-

banks , whidh then must subscribe to additional stock of the
Reserve Bank .

On December 31, 1952, the total capital and

surplus of the Federal Reserve banks amounted to $971 , 657,
12
000 .

Distribution of E§rnings :

Under the provisions of the

Federal Reserve Act , the dividents that may be paid by a
Federal Reserve B.'lnk on its outst~nding capital stock are
limited to 6 per cent per annum.
are cumulative .

These dividends , however ,

F:rom time to t:i.nB change::: have been made by

Congress relative to the provisions in the Act wh:.ch governs
the distribution of the net earnings of the Federal Reserve
Banks after the dividend requirements have been met .
The Act provided, originally, that half of the net
earnings of each Federal Reserve Bank should go to the government as a franchise tax, and t he remainder should be accumulated
in the surplus account of the bank until the surplus was equal

to 40 per cent of the paid in capital of the bank, after which
13
all net earnings should go to the goveenment .
Under an amendment to the Act in 1919, all net earnings
above divident charges were to be paid into the surplus account

:r2
Federal Reserve Bulletin, February 1953 , p . 1292
13
H. Parker Hillis , The Theory~ Practice of Central Banking ,
New York : 'Ihe R~nd Press Co ., 1936, p. 71
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of the bank witil this fwid amounted to 100 per cent of the
capital of the Reserve Bank, after which 10 per cent of the
net earnings were to be credited to surplus and the balance
paid to the government as a franchise tax.

The distribution

of the earnings of the Federal Reserve Banlc was changed again
in 1933 by the .oanking Act of that year .
The Act provided that all net earnings above dividernil
charges were to be credited to the surplus accowit of the Reserve Banks .

The franchise tax appears to have been repealed

in order to enable the Reserve Banks to build up their surpluses
as rapidly as possible after Congress had required each reserve
bank to subscribe to Class B stock of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation an amowit equal to half of its surplus as
of January 1 , 1933 .

Far the twelve Federal Reserve Banks this

meant a dininution in their surplus amounting to approximately
,.
14
.-.;>139,ooo , ooo .
Since the opening of the Federal Reserve Banks in 1914,
their total net earnines until the close of 1951 amounted to
~;2, 010 , 804, 661 , out of which they have paid $305 , 906, 998 in
dividends; over ~l , 000 , 000 was paid to the United Treasury
and apProximately $664, 000 , 000 was credited to the ourplus
15
account of the banks .

14
15

The Federal Reserve System. op . cit ., P• 85
Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System for 1951, p . 64
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Directors and

fficers :

board of nine directors .

Each Federal Reserve Bank has a

Three of them are lrnO'\•m as Class A

directors, threa as Class B directors , and three as Class C
directors .

Class A and Class B directors are elected by member

banks , one director of each clss being elected by small banks ,
one director of each class by banks of medium size , and one
of each class by large banks .

The three Class A directors - at

the time of election must be actively engaged in the banking
business, and he must sever all relations at his bank upon
election .

Class B directors are business men, and at the tiule

of election they must be actively engaged in agriculture ,
commerce or industry.

At the time of election, they must

16
sever all relations with the business .
The three Class C directors are designated by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

They must not be

officers , directors , employees, or stockholders of any bank .
One of them is

esignated by ~he Board of Governors as Chairman

of the Reserve B.,,nlc 1 s board of directors and one as De"Juty
Chairman.

The vheL"'T.lan , by statute , also serve as Federal

Reserve Agent .

17

Branches Q.f the Federal Reserve Banks :

As has been

pointed out , the Federal Recerve System is divided into twelve

16
Charles R. ,Thittlesey, Princiules fil1d Practices of Honey and
Bankin~ The :Macmillan Com')any, New York : 1948, p . 91

17
'
Ib¼., p . 92

districts .

The district boundaries do not always follow State

lines and in map:iJ instances part s of the same State ar e in
different districts .

There is a Federal Reserve Bank in each

district and some of the Reserve Banks hove branches .
18
of the districts and branches is given below:

A list

Federal Reserve Bank f Boston - District llu:nber

1

Federal Reserve Bank of New York - Di strict Humber
Branch at Buffalo , New York

2

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia - District NUr::J.ber

3

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland - District Number
4
Branches: Cincinnati, Ohio ; Pittsburgh , Pennsylvania
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond - District Number
Branches: Baltimore, Naryland; L>harlott , lforth
Carolina

5

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta - District Number
6
Branches: Birmingham, Alabama; Jaclcsonville, Flordia;
Nashville , Tennessee; New Orleans , Louisiana
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - District 11UI:1ber
Branch at Detroit, Hichigan

7

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - District Number
Branches : Little Rock Arkansas; Louisville Kentucky;
Hemphis, Tennessee

8

Federal Reserve Bank of hinneapolis - District Number
Branch at Helena , Hontana

9

Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City - District lh.m:ber 10
Branches: Denver , Colorado; Oklahoma City, O' lahoma ;
Omaha , Nebraska

18
The Federal eserve System - Purposes and Function, Board of
Governors , ~fashington: 1954, PP • 72- 73
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Federal eserve Bank of Dallas, District Number
Branches: El Paso , Texas , Houston, Te::::as; San
Antonio , Texas

11

Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco - District Number
Bfanches : Los Angles , California; Pottland, Oregon;
Salt Lake City, Utah; Seattle, Iashington

12

Hember Banks:
Qualifications for Hembershi p :

At mid - 1953 , the Federal

Reserve System had 6, 765 member banks .

Of these, 4,&~4 were

National banks and 1, 891 were State-chartered banks .

All banks

with national clllirters were required to belong to the System.
Banks with State charters may voluntarily join the System if
qualified for membership , and if accepted by the ?ederal Reserve .
While somewhat less than one- half of all banks in the United
StateG belonged to tha System, in mid- 1953 they held about

19
three-fourth of the country ' s total bank deposits .
It will be noted that member banks hold about 85 per cent
of the demand deposits of all banks , which along with currency
serve as means of payment .

Consequently, Federal Reserve pol-

icies have a direct influence on institutions holding nearly
nine- tenths of the bank deposits that a~e the major component
of the country ' s active money supuly.
Advantages of Member ship :

By becoming members of the

19
Th__g Federal Reserve System, op . cit ., P• 70
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Federal Reserve System, banks become eligible to use all of the
System ' s facilities and , in return , undertake to abide by certain
rules prescribed by law, or developed by regulation in accordance
20
with the law, for the protection of the public interest .
Through Federal Reserve membership , a bank as sumes several
important obligations:

To comply wit h the reserve requirements

of the Federal Reserve and to keep its required reserves on deposit with intere~ t at its .eserve Bank; to be subject to"1Brious
requirements of the Federal law with respect to branch banking,
holding company regulation, inter-locking directorates , certain
loan and investment limitations , and other matters; and, if
the member bank is chartered by a State , to 0e subject to general
21

supervision and examination by the Federal Reserve .

In return, member banks are entitled to the following
principal privileges, among others : (1) to borrow from the Federal Reserve Banks , subject to tests for borrowing set by a statute
and regula tion, when temporarily in need for additional funds;
(2) to use Federal Reserve facilities for col lecting checks .

settling clearing balances , and transferring funds to other
cities; (3) to obtain currency whenever required; (4) to share
20
H. Parker 'Tillis and John M. Chapman, ~ Bankin" Situation,

Uew York : Columbia Univer sity Press , 1934, p. 702
21

Ibi,g. p . 721
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in the informational facilities provided '.

the System; (5) to

participate in the election o.r six of the nine directors of a
Federal

serve Bank; and (6) to receive a cumulative statutory

divident of 6 per cent on the paid-in capital of the Federal
22
Reserve &nks .

Function

Q.f ~ Federal Reserve System:

The Control of Credit:

Within the limits imposed by the

restrictions of law and the availability of its own gold reserves ,
the Federal Reserve attempts to control the volume of bank lending
and investment .
If a member bank is in need of additional funds it may borrow
from a Federal Reserve bank in two ways: (1) it may rediscount
some of its customer ' s notes with its Reserve bank or (2) it may
give its ovm note secured by appropriate collateral.

Ihen a

member bank applies for the rediscount ofsome of its paper it
is required to certify that the paper is eligible , and that it
has not been acquired from a nonmember bank .

The responsibility

for determining whether or not the paper is eligible for redis23

count rests with the Reserve Bank.

It is under no obligation

to grant the credit .
Before rediscounting paper presented to it, the Reserve
22
23

The Federal Reserve System,
Th~, p . 26

.QI?.•

ill•

P• 9
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Bank is expected to inform itself as to the applicant ' s need for
the funds and use to which the funds will be put .
an important deter..unant .

The latter is

The Reserve bank is authorized to de-

termine not only the eligibility of tl:B paper offered for rediscount but also its acceptability.

aper may meet the require-

ments for eligibility and still not be acceptable .
In determining the acceptability of paper the Bonk must
consider: (1) the soundness of the paper, (2) the desirability
of extending additional credit to the ap Jlicant, (3) general
business conditions , and the probable effect of the extension
of additional credit on credit conditions .
The Note Issue Function :

24

The Federal Reserve notes were

fully secured by collateral but the note issue could expand and
contract with business requirements , since the notes were secured by a 40 per cent gold reserve and the balance of the collateral was in the form a: commercial paper .

The com:nercial paper

furnished the elastic element in the issue of the notes .

As

business became more active more rediscounted com:nercial paper
was available as security for the notes and more notes could be
provided to meet the increased demands for n~nBy .

As business

contracted , less money was required and less money was available

24

Charles R. Whittlessey, Princiules and ractices Qi. Moeny ~
Banking, The lfa.cmillon Com:?any, New York : 1948, pp . 163-168
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since there was a smaller amount of conrnercial paper to secure
25
the Federal Reserve notes .
With the virtual disappearance of collll~ercial paper in the
depression of thel930 1 s , some otner type of collateral was required to secure the Federal Reserve notes .

The Glass- Stegall

Act of 1932 provided that the security over and above the 40
per cent in gold could be in the f orm of United States bonds

26
instead o~ comr:iercial paper .
At the present time the Reserve b:mks must hold gold certificates equal to 25 per cent of their Federal Reserve notes
outstanding and the balance of the collateral may be in the
form of either gold ce~tificates or promissony notes, bills of
exchange , acceptances , or government securities .

Gover nment

bonds have come to be used more and more as the principal collateral behing these notes; the amount of commercial paper used
Zl

as their security is relatively insignificant .
·Tith the decline in the amounts of dincounted co:m:iercial
paper available and with the substitution of other collateral
as security for the Federal Reserve notes , this type of paper
money lost nost of its elasticity.

Its backing consists at

25

Federal Reserve Bulletin,

2§.
27

February 1942, p . 42

Federal Reserve 3ulletin, l:arch 194!~,
-

-

• 76

~:'edcrnl --eservo Bulletin, Septenbe1· 19Ll.,,, , . 51
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present of a reserve alnost en~irely in the form ~f ~old certificates (end eold certi~icate credits) and United States
28
fovernmcnt securities .
The Croen 1·..arket Operation:

Purchase and sale of 'United

States Government securities in the open !larket (stock exchange) has been the major device used by tho Federal Reserve
since the 1920 1 s to control the volume of member- bank reserves .
By buying Gover:nents , the ~eserve authorities increase memberbank reserves; by selling Governments , they reduced member-

bank reserves .

29
When the Open l1arket Committee wants to t ighten nember
reserves , say because an inflationary boom is impendine , it
sells Governments in the open markets to whoever bids fo:i.~ them individuals , businesses , or bunks .

If a member ba ..1k buys the

bond , it :r;ays by transferring vl, 000 cash (reserves) to the
Federal .1eserve ; on the bank ' s balnnce sheet, ttca sh 11 goes

30
down and "bonds" go up .

Thus the bank losses a full $1 , 000

of excess reserves , since its deposits remain unchanged .
If a business or individual buys the bond from the Reserve ,
the erfect is al.most the same .

If he pays in currency he dir-

ectly lessens the amount of money in circulation.

l.fore l~ely,

28
29

30

Federal Reserve Bulletin, October 1949, p . 68
Secretary of the Treasury, Annual Reoorts .QU the State· 91.
the Finance13J. :fashington : 1953, p . 21
Ib~ .' p . 32
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he pays by a check on his bank .

If so , his bank's reserves are

reduced by 0.1 , 000 when the Federal Reserve presents the check
for collection.

The member bank ' s deposits also drop by the

vl,000 transferred from the bond buyer ' s account to the Federal
Reserve .

Since the bank losses $1 ,000 in both deposits and re-

serves, its excess reserves drop $800 .

31

The Federal Reserve creates new commercial- bank reserves
by buying government bonds .

By increasing the bank ' s excess

rosorves, the Federal Reserve increases their incentive to
make new loans and investments , for no banker likes to lose
the interest he might earn on idle reserves .

If excess res-

erves are already larr;e, however, open-market purchases won 't
do r:iuch to stimulate credit expansion.

If bankers are holding

excess reserves becaL se they aren ' t llsound 11 business deoonds
1

for lo.1ns, there may be much the Federal Reserve can do about it.
QJ,earing and Collection Function:

The clearing and collection

of checks is an important part of the facilities afforded by the
Federal Reserve System.

Zach of the Federal Reserve banks acts

as a collection agent for its member banks .

It clears at par

(honors at face value) all checks dra\m on members and depositors
of the Reserve banks and deposited with it for collection.

A

nonmember bank may use the Federal Reserve clearing system if

31
~

-, p . 33
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it maintains a balance at the Federal Reserve bank of its district for that purpose .

It must also remit at par each check

drawn on it by one of its depositors and return to it through
the clearing process for collection.

32

32
P.orold G. Houltoh, Financial Organization and the Economic Systen,
McGraw- Hill Book Company, New York : 1938 , P• 47
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CHAPTER V
F.ED2RAL K:.:SERVE CREDIT CONTROL M3X:H.ANISM rn OPERATION
~

of Credit Control Under :1!1!?. Federal Reserve System

Quantitative Credit Control:
~

Discount &.t&_:

(1)

Nature and Use:

The bank note

or discount rate is one of the devices by which a central bank
exercises control over the banking system.

It is the traditional

method by which central banks have attempted to encourage or discourage borrowing operations .

Under a central banking system

where the central bank is the lender of last resort, the comm1

ercial banks are nonnally dependent upon it for emergency funds .
Banks which are

11

loaned out 11 may expand their reserves thro-

ugh rediscounting eli gible commercial paper with the central
bank.

In the United States , in addition, the member bank may

borrow on its 01.m promissory note secured by acceptable collateral.
If the central bank wishes to discourage further ex,ansion of
credit it may raise the rediscount rate .
discourage further bonowing .

'Ihis is supposed to

Conversely, by lowering the rate , the

cost of borrowing is reduced and that is expected to encourage
2

borrovdng and an expansion of credit .
1

George 1:1 . Edwards , Principles of B9 nkinP, and Finance, Roland
Press Company, New York : 1932, P• 246

2

Willis , .s;m. £il., p. 47
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A change in the banking rate not only affects the cost of
accommodation at the central bank but it reflects the judgment
of the central bank authorities as to whether there is too little
or too much money available for the conduct of business .
ifuat has just been stated relative to the discounting or
commercial paper apJlies to advances made to banks on the basis
of their notes secured by acceptable collateral .

A Eederal Re-

3

serve bank is under no obligation to grant credit.

The policy

of the Federal He serve banks bas been e:>..-p:..·essed principally, not
in the granting or the refusal of loans , but in the rcte charged
for discounts and advances .
The Federal Reserve at first relied on the discount rate
as its principal instrument of general restraint .

It e~:ercised

its control over the volume of credit primarily by lowering or
raising the price
banks .

9t

which it was willing to lend reserves to

The discount rate was lowered or raised with the view

that chnnges in this price would (1) signal a change in the Federal Reserve 1 s willineness to ext "!nd credit to ::nember banks
4
and (2) alter the bank ' s willingness to borrow reserves . This ,
in t ' n , would affect the willin6-ness and the ability of these
3

alter E. Spahr , The Federal Reserve §ystem and~ Control
.Qf Credit, Macmillan Company, New York : 1931, p . 382
4
Willis, .9.:!2.• ,ill. p . 26

banks to make lam.s to their customers .
The rates of discount which Federal Reserve banks may
charge for the various classes of paper discounted by them are
subject to review and determination by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System.
During the early ~ears of its existence, variation i n rediscount rates constituted the principal means by which Federal
Reserve policy was expressed with respect to the money supply.
In recent years, however, th e rediscount rate has lost much of
its importance as an instrument of credit control, in part because of the development of hew forms of credit restraint and,
in part, the decline in member bank borrowing during the 1930 ' s
5
and 1940 1 s .
During the 1930 1 s the rediscounts and direct advances of
the Reserve banks declined to negligible proportions partly
because of the tremendous inflow of 6old from abroad which gave
member vanks additional reserves without resource to borrowing
from the Reserve banks .

Later , as a result of wartime develop-

ments, discounts for member banks continued to be relatively
small .

Although the rediscount rate has played a role of minor

importance in recent years as an ~nstrument of credit control,
it can have an important influence on the money supply.
5

The Federal

eserve ~stem. op. cit ., P• 49
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(Z) Effectiveness of~ Discount Rate:

There has been a

considerable amount of discus~ion concerning the efficiency of
the discount rate as an instrument of credit control.

The eff-

ectiveness of discount policy depends to some extent upon the
ability of the central bank to shape the loan policies of the
commercial banks.

It depends more upon the effectiveness of

the discount rate in influencing market rates of interest and
customer rates at banks than upon the volume of money borrowed.
Changes in the discount by the Federal Reserve banks have not
been quickly reflected in rates charged customen by member
banks.

Experience shows that there has been little disposition

toward altering custoner rates in response to changes in rates
6

charged by the Reserve banks.

The rates charged by member

banks have tended to be sluggish or sticky.

Hany commercial

banks charged the same rate of interest for years.
The rate of discount char~ed by a central bank (and varied
by the central authorities as economic circumstances charge) has
only an indirect effect upon the rate charged by coIIm1ercial
banks.

Changes in the rediscount rate can li.ave a direct effect

upon the credit situation only if :raember banks find it necessary
to borrow.

If banks do not find it neceasary to borrow from the

Reserve banks the rcdiscount rate can have no effect upon the
6

Tillis,

QJ2..

£.ll., p. 32

market because changes in the rate will not be passed on to customers
of the member banks in the form of higher or lower rates .

If there

are considerable excess reserves at the disposal of the member banks,
changes in the rediscount rate can have little effect upon the rate
which borrowers from the member banks are required to pay.

The

traditional reluctance of member banks to become indebted to the
Reserve banks have rendered the rediscouht rate less effective truin
it might otherwise have been.
There are some authorities who believe the discount rate could
not be made effective even if the banks did have to apply to the
7

cent ral banks for rediscounting accommodati on .

They doubt whether

or not an increased ra t e of rediscount would have the desired deterrent effect since changes in rediscount rates do not spread ouickly
to other rates.

Further increased discount rates, even if passed

on to the customer in the f orm of a higher interest rate , may not
deter the customer from borrowing if the return he receives from
the boITowed funds exceeds the cost of tho funds .
One of the principal objec t ions to the r ed~scount rate as an
instrument of credit is that t he initiative is not in the hands of
8

the central bank .

As already indicated, cLanges in the rate can

7

Russell D. Kilborne, Princiules .Qf Money .rul!l Bankin_g, A. 1.
Shaw Company, 1937, p. 380
8
Harold G. Houlton, Financial Organization, University of Chicago
Press , 1930, p . 241
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have a direct influence only if the connnercial banks are ~creed to
borrow from the central bank, and even tmn changes in the rate
may not be reflected in the rate the borrowing banks charge their
customers.

Changes in the rediscount rate do not directly affect

the reserves of the commercial banks .
Changes in discount rates may have been psychological effects in that they reflect the attitude of the Reserve a uthorities
9

relative to credit conditions .

Increases in rates serve as

notice to banks that the Reserve banks intend to use their powers
to restrict credit.

This may induce bankers to becom3 less liberal

in the granting of loans .

Conversely, a lowering of the rediscount

rate assures bankers of easier cr edit conditions and it may induce
them to be more liberal in their attitude toward loans .
r.xperience seems toshow that raising the rediscount rate may
be more effective than lowering the rediscount rate, particularly
if r ate increases come at a time when low excdGs reserves force
member banks to rediscount .

Low discount rates are much less likely

to stimulate new bank loans durinr; depression periods when banks
have excess reserves and there is no need for them to rediscount .
The views expressed concerning the effectiveness of the discount
rate a ;ply also to changes in the re t e charged on advances .
9

Samuel P. Orth, .American National Goverrunent , F. S. Crafts and
Company, New York: 1931, p . 96
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Qrum Market Operations:

Nature:

During the 1920 1 s the Federal Reserve banks began

to use open mrket operations as an instrument to influence
credit conditions.

The term open market operations refers to

the purchase and sale, in the open market, of certain assets by
10
the Federal Reserve banks,
the principal types being bankers 1
acceptances, bills of exchange, and the obligations of the
Federal Government.
Qrufil Market Operations

~ Bank

Reserves:

In providing for

the creation of the Federal Open Harket Committee and the regulation by the Committee ar the open market transactions of the
Federal Reserve b:mks, Congress laid dO\•m the following policy
directive that should be observed in connection with open market
operations:
The time, character, and volume of all purchases an:l sales
of paper described in Section 14 of tLis act as eligible for Open
harket Operations shall be governed with a view to accor:nnodating
commerce and business and with regard to their bearing upon the
gener al credit situation of the count.ry.ll
As~ method of influencing the money supply open mrket

operations differ from discount operations primarily because they
are undertaken at the initiative of the Federal Reserve System,
10
~

11

Federq;J. Reserve Act, Section 14

~ Federal Reserve
Act of 1933

!£1, Section 12A, as amended

by the Brnking
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not at the initiative of the member banks .

In the case of dis-

counts the Federal Reserve banks can do no more than establish
a discount rate .

It can have no direct effect until a member

bank applies for credit accommodiations .

In the case of open

market operations , the Federal Open :Market Committee of the
Federal Reserve can decide of its own accord whether there is
too little or too much money, and it can proceed, through the
purchase or sale of government securities or bankers ' acceptance , to affect the size of member bank reserves which constitute
basis for the money supply .
The sale of Government securities by the reserve banks reduces the reserves of member banks and restricts their ability to
extend credit .

Conversely, the purchase of Government securities

in the open market expands the reserves of member banks .

If the

banks sell the securities directly to the • eserve banks they
receive a credit to their reserve account .

If individuals , or

others , sell securities through the medium of security dealers ,
the Reserve bank give the dealers a check drawn on the Reserve
12
bank.
'l'he dealer deposits the check with a member bank which
in turn deposits it with a Federal Reserve Bank.

In this way the

menber bank reserves are increased .
12
~ Federal Reserve System - Its

urpose and Function, Board
of Governors , Washington, D. C.: 1954, PP • 102- 104
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Open Market Operations

~

.th.2

~

of Interest :

Open Market

operations not only affect the total reserve position of commercial
banks; they also have some impact on the prices and yields of goverRment obligations .

Heavy selling of securities by the Federal Res-

erve banks tends to depress the market prices of these obligations ,
which in effect rises their yield~ The rise in the real rate of
interest in a market sensitive to the yield on government securities may reduce the availability of credit ordinarily e:dended by
commercial banks and institutional investors holding large quanti13
ties of these sec rities .
Open market purchases , on the other
hand , not only increase the reserves of commercial banks ; they also
tend to reduce the cost of credit throughout the enti re money market .
As in any kind of market , demand wi~l sometimes exceed supply,
and supply will sometimes exceed demand; rates of interest and discount will sometimes rise and sometimes fall .

It is the responsibility

of the Federal Reserve authorities to watch over the market to
prevent fluctuations from becoming violent , and through pruchases
or sales an:.l rate policies to endeavor to maintain orderly credit
conditions .

Host of the measures taken by the Federal Reserve

suthorities have their most direct influence on the money market
through the medium of bank reserves .
Limitations of Qrum Market Operation :

There are certain

13
A. G. Hart ' Money , _
Debt, _
and Econor.ri.c Activity.
(2d ed . )
6
Uew :fork: Prentice-Hall , Inc ., 1953, P• 1 7

limitations to the capacity of the Reserve banks to increase or decrease the reserves of the member banks through open market operations .

One of the limitations to increases in member bank reserves

is the legal limit to which the Reserve banks themselves are subject .
As member banks reserves expand this increases the deposit liabilities of the Reserve Banks .

Just as reserve requirements limit the

deposit liability of membe

banks , so reserve requirements limit

the extent to which Reserve bank liabilities may expand.

Congress

can, however , through legislation, reduce the reserve which the
Reserve banks must maintain against deposit liabilities from 35 per
14
cent to 25 per cent .
The maximun amo.Jlt by which Reserve banks may shrink the reserves of commercial banks is limited by the amount of government
15
securities and bankers ' acceptances held by the Reserve banks .
If the excess reserves of the member banks a::.·e large in comparison
with the disposal securities held by the Federal Reserve System,
the sale of securities will not mop up the excess .ceserves of the
member banks and the Reserve System cannot make its credit policy
effective under such circumstances .

This was the case just be.1.ore

the passage of the Banking Act of 1935, which gave the Federal
Reserve System power to vary the reserve requirement of the ~ember

14
R. A. Gordon, Business Fluctations, Harper & Brothers, Uew
York: 1952, pp . 77- '217
15
Federal Reserve Bulletin, August 1945 , P• 789
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16
banks \lithin certain limits .
The open market power oi' the Reserve System was inadequate to
control the excess reserves of the member banks after 1933.
sults of the

s re-

ontinued inflow of gold during 1934-1935 and the in-

ability of the member banks to keep their funds employed through
ordinary lending channels, the excess reserves of the member banks
reached the unprecedented level of ,i>3 billions while the portfolio
of government securities held by the Reserve banks remained at less

17
than 2--} billions.
Change§ in Hember Bank Reserve J.eguirement :
Scope:

The situation has changed greatly since that time.

Today as a result of the war, Reserve banks hold tremendous aI:tounts
of government securities - about $24 billions at the end of October ,

18

1954.

On the same date the excess reserves of member banks were

19
approxima vely $700 millions.
Hot all open market operations of the Reserve System are desiened
to effect changes in member bank reserves, a:::.though changes in such do
occur as a result of these operations .

16
Federal Reserve Bcnk of Hew York, honthly Review, July 1952,
p. 99
17
Statistical Abstract of .trua United States, 1954
18
Ibi_g
19
Ib:i_si
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During the war and in the postwar period the Federal
banks supported the government security market .

eserve

This was d,.,ne

particularly at those times when new Treasury o.:'ferings of securities tended to depress the rnrket .

Under these circumstances it

is not ::-ossible for the Re::ierve System to confine its operations
to meeting the economy ' s current nedd for bank credit .
The third means of credit control at tle disposal of the
Reserve authorities is tr...e power given the Board of Governors by
the Banking Act or 1935 to change the reserve r ates of the three
classes of r:1en.ber bon.'>{s .

ong other thinGs t he Act provided :

The Board of Govennors of the Federnl Reserve Syst,em, upon
the affirmative vote o.i: not less than four of its • embers , in
ordoT to prevent injurious credit e~mansion or contract:on, rnny
by regulntion chan::;e the requirements on to reserves to be nainta ined against de::iand or time depo:::i ts or both (1) "u~- :ie: ber
banlrn in central reser ve cities or (2) b :-:c:iber b..,n1:::; in re::;erve cities or (3) b:t :::i.o::::ioer b :: nlrn not in rc:sc:!.'VC or centrnl
reserve cities or (4) "':)~r nlI ::::-.ember bnnl:s; but the anount o" the
reserves reouired ·:-.o be naintalned by any ;::;uch u1c:-aber "J: nl: .t as n a
resul t o:: any ::mch change shall not be leas -L..an t _e an')un G Oi.
reso:.·ves required by law ~.;o be ::1aintninec b-'J cuch bank on the
eru::ct::i.ent of the Bcnl:in8 ct =if 1935 nor ..•o:.e t.han tw:.ce such
amount . 20
.I.

,

The principle t.mderlyin.:; th:'..s ~ethod of controlling the
volu."':le of credit in thnt chaTIGinG tr.e ratio or reserves to b:mk
deposits alters the total amount of deposits that con be su~porte
l::r,1 a given amount of reserves .

Since c..cposits a. e ::iainly· created

by bank loans , rnising reserve ratios restr·cts banl: lending power .

20

The ~=~

eserve ..fil of

12Ji,

Soct::.on 19
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An increase in reserve requirements can be used to o~'f::;et increa::;es

in lendins pmTer arising from net gold import::; on Federal Re::;erve
bank acquisitions of ·overnment securities .
The .._Jouer to alter reserves ratios is one of the most potent of
the instrunents of credit control available to the Federal • cserve
Systera .

It is a :::'J..exible means of control since the Board of

Governors can vary the reserve ratio betwern certain lir:lit::; _ixed
b:r law, and raise the rntio :f'or one cla ::;s

01.

nember banks, and leave

the ratio unchanged or lower it for other cla::;sc::; of member bon1 :s .
Limitations:

As a dev5.ce for al terine tLe reserves of me;.1ber

21
banks, this instrument is effective but it is ::;ubject to criticisn,
The effect of this means of keeping the reserves of menber banl:s
within m nageable limits is rather harsh .
distributed among the banks of the country.
excess reserves and others may r...ave none .

Th:cess reserves are not
Some banks have large
~·Jhen re::;erve requirement::;

are increased sot1e banks are hit harder than others .

:•lhile it

lowers the excess .'e::;erves of some ban!:s it puts others into debt
with the Reserve banks and forces thED to di::;pose of earning as::iets,
sometimes on a market ·.Jhich is being su11ported by tr.e Re::;erve tanks .
If banks are given a ple notice of the contemplated increase in
reserves they will have time to meet the si tu.ation and :r.ake
proper adjustments .
21
ileloflihg , .9.Il"• cit . p . 290

e
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Action on reserve requirements is not adapted to day- to- day
changes ::..n banking and monetary conditions .

Frequent chances in

requirements by small percentage amounts would be disturbing to
roe~nber banks .

For these reasons the nethod of influencing the

volume o"'" available bank reserves and th4 money supply is usually employed only to adjust the banking structure to large scale
changes in the country ' s supply of monetary reserves .

It is not

employed to nake f~equent and delicate adjust,~ents to current
changes in the money supply.
For this reason the Federal Reserve Systen depends principally on discount and open market operations .

Open har ket oper-

ations are a ::iuch more flexible instrument of credit policy than
changes in reserve requirements, and can be used to soften changes
after alternations have been made in the reserve requirentnts of
member banks to bring them within manageable proportions.
Proposals for

eform :

Jhere reserve r equirements are used as

tools or instruments of credit policy, it has been suggested that
certain advantages could be had by relating reserves not only to
22

deposits but to assets .

It has been stated that relating reserves

to assets would permit reserve r equirements to be applied selectively.
For example , higher reserves might be required with respect to a
22

The Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 5ubcor:nittee on
General Credit Control and Debt Hanar.;ement , ,.onetary 01 · cy
ang ~ lJanagement af ~ ublic Debt : (1952) Pt . II, 82d
Conr; ., S. Doc. 123, P• '2r/7
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particular class of a bank ' s loan or investment .

The Council of

Zconom.ic Advisers have suggested that the Board of Governors should
receive an increase in authority over reserve requirenonts that
would give it considerable latitude in determining the amotmt and
the content of reserves , and tr..e bases on which reserve::, ~ay be

23
related,

and recomm.end that the Board I s authority over reser-

ves could include the right to ?ermit banks to carry in their
legal re::-erves government securities to be specified by the Board .

24

It was the view of the Council that this device would be nn
important addition to the means by which objectives of credit nolicy and debt management can be reconciled .

The Council believed

that the Board should be authorized to require at least a ;ortion
of legal reserves to be related to changes in the volurae of clnsses

25
of assets to be designated by the Board .
The Board o~ Governors of the Federal £eserve System on a
number of occasions, both in its annual reJorts and throueh representatives appearing before CoI:llilittees o~ Congress, has so~~ht
authority to require reserves add.i.tional to those it is now authorized to require , and the power to require that thece additional
reserves be held in the fortjl of specified types of intcrest-bearinr;

23
Joint Economic Report,

24
25

Ibi_g_, p . 879
Ib~., p . 880

.Q.£ •

ill•,

P • 878
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United States securities .
The Senate subcormnittee on General Credit Control and Debt
1anagement in its report in 1952 stated that while it saw no
irmn.ediate need for the imposition of higher reserve requirements
or for reserve requi~ements of new forms , it J elieved that further
consideration should be given to the adoption of legislation providing the Board of Governors with additional powers over bank

26
reserve requirenents for use at its discretion .
Qualitative Credit Control :
Margin ".eauirements:
cash or on margin.

Securities may be purchased either i'or

The nargin represents the .mm payment the
27

purchaser is required to nake at the time the security is ?urchasod .
The authority of the Board of Governors to regulate margin
requirements is exercised under the Congressional policy directive
that such regulations shnll be for the preventing of e:-:cessive use

28

of credit for the purchase or earring of securities .
The Board of Governors is authorized to .)rescribe lower r:i.argin
requirements i

it decws t :~s necessary or appropriate for the

26
Joint Committee on the Toonoillic Report , Subcom."lll.ttee 1n General
Credit ancl Debt Hanagement , Honetary Po:.ic·· filID :;;ana ·er. ent
.Q,£ ~ Publ :.c Debt : (1952) , 62d Session, . . . Soc . 163, P • 3-4
27
The Federal Reserve System, op . cit . p . 62

28

Federal Reserve Bg).letl!!, July 1953, P• 729
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accommodation of commerce and industry, havine due regard to the
general credit situation of the country, and to prescribe higher
margin requirements ';Then it deems this neccssa;ry or appropriate
to prevent excessive use of credit to finance secur~ty transations .
Through the use of mareins , the Board of Governors can exert
a restraininu influence on the use of credit for speculative
purposes without limiting the supply or raising the cost of credit
to those engaged in industry, agriculture , or t:..·acle .

It l:L'!'!li ts

the amount of credit that can be extended on a security by prescribing the maximum percentage of the market value of a security
that can be loaned .

By raising nargin requirements the Board can

dam:,en the demand for credit used in the purchase of securities .
This ins ::,rument of credit control can restrict the use of credit
for certain Jurposes but it does not control the total quantity
of credit .

29

Installment Credit Control :

A second type of selective credit

control , authority t o curb the use of credit for cons~~ptive purposes , was t:iven to the Board of Governors of the Fe-..eral Reserve
System by an ex , cutive orde r of the President is.med on ugust 9,
30

1941 .

This authority was given the Board at a tine when consum-

ers ' goods, narticularly durable goods , wrs curtailed because the

29
Federal

e erve Bulletin, July 1953 , P• 7]0

30

Federal Re erve Bulletin, April 1949, P· 860
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equipment, material, and labor required for their ryroduction was
diverted to defense production .
The ultimate purpose of consumer credit rogulations is to
reduce consumer credit deI!land for scarce goods and thus to reduce
inflationary pressures on the price level.

The regulation of

consumer credit has special significance in periods when goods
are scarce and there is limited production.
Voluntary Credit Restraint Program,:

The voluntary credit

restraint program announced in Earch, 1951, and tenninated in Lay,
1952, was , in essence, a progra

for selective cr,..dit C"'ntrol.

In

effect the proc;ram urged financial institutions to screen loan
applications on the b:lSis of purpose - the use to m:ch the p:::-oceeds of loans would be put .

Under this program lenders de- eloped

the impression, to s~ne ext ent, at least , that if the vol..ntary
proGra~ did not produce reasonably satisfactory results , the
Reserve banks or the r-overnment would i.:ipose , some type of nore
L>
31
positive and perhaps less desirable neans of rvstriction.
The chairm.an of he Board of Governors of the Fe<leral
eserve System has stated that the Voluntary Credit Restraint rogram made an important contribution to the eosinn of inflationary
pressures and to the sloi!ing do,m in the rote of credit e;: 3nsion

31
Chairman of the ~oard of Governorc of the •e eral eserve
System, Subcommi ttee on General Credit Control and Debt
Hanagement , Com-:-:,endium (1952) Pt . 1 , P • 422
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3.2
in 1951.
The Senate Subcommittee on General Credit Control and Debt
Management, however stated that it was disturbed by the longer
run implications of programs of this type , that the criteria for

making loans under such a program must , in the nature of the case,
be vague and shifting, and tr.at there was a danr;er of substituting
the private prejudices of leaders for the criteria of the p~ice
33
system.

32
33

Ibid , p . 438
Subcommittee on General Credit Control and Debt Eana~ement,
Report ~ (1951), p. 38
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CHAPTZR VI
cmrsm,IPTIV.J: C ),l;DIT CONTROL UNDER TIE FEI1. ,1
LES;:;ON Ilf :OIIBY

'°

-

RESERVZ _

TAG.u ..)IT

Consumer Credit
Def'inition:
Consumption credit m.ny be defined as the obligation to nnke
payment on the right to receive payment in the future on account
1
of a present transfer of consumption eoods .

Iw,ortancEz:
The purpose of consumer credit is to enn ble the borrower to
enjoy an inco::ie before earnins it or otherwise receiving it .
Some producers , f armers, for i nst nee, get their income at
irregular intervals and need to soend a larger part of their
consumption through the months that intervene between harvesting
and the oale of successive crops .

Others like the mass of in-

dUD t rial wage earners , get their income in a steady strean but
need to concentrate part oi their ex::Jendituros at irre~ ar interv... ls .

rt(,j ust:.ient::,

can be made only in one of two wa;;'s -- b-.f savi "

income in advance of tl,e heav-y infreq ent ,ayments or by boITowing
1

Raymond P . Kent , honey sUL Jnnkin_g, .. ienhn_ t and Company, Inc .,
Hew York : 1951, p . 630

to meet these de11.ands and saving the :ioney al'terward .

The former

method is the cheaper , since it saves the payment of interest , but
it is not always practicable or preferable .

Sometimes the necessity

for extraordinary e:::pendi tures appear ui thout warning before it has
been possible to ;::iake provision for it by saving; sometimes the enjoyment that co:1es i'rom an earlier expenditure is uorth t .e added
cost, and sometioes , unfortunately, a consumer is constitutionally
unable to save e;•cept under th~ pressure of a contractual obl::.gation.
~er;ulation of Consumer Credit
Origin and Operation of Regulation~:
Modern Consumer Credit regulation hcd its origin, perhaps , ·n
World far II .

The great demand for consumer durable goods had to

be checked as the su·)ply became limited due to the ~

.

This need for control was made effective through Regulation

ll

of the Board of Governors of the ~ederal Reserve Syscem issued
under authority of an :;:;::mcutive Onder of the President ,

1941.

The Board

o::

UBUst 9,

Governors of the Fed.oral • eserve Syste:::i w::rn

autho_izcd nt 0 regulate tb.e te .. sand conditions under which credit
repayable in instalnents DB.Y be extended for purchasing or carr;ing
consmaers ' durable goods ••

II

The pm1pose and the reasons _or r ccl':lating const.n:1er credit and
for as ~igning this task to the Boa:i:d of Governors were set forth i n
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the Ex::ecutive Order .

Federal Reserve Board Chairman Marriner S. Eccles

clarified the Executive Order on August 25 , when he issued the statement that
fore .

11

by and large people !:.ave more money to spend :than ever be-

This is happening at a time when more and more of our industrial

plants must be used to produce defense materials • • • • •

ccordinuly

it is of primary importance that restraints be placed upon the wholesale extension of credit, including instalment buying •••• It is a
suppleEental instrument to be us od in conjunction with the broader ,
more basic fiscal and other governmental powers in combating price
inflation .
2

. . . The intent is not to disrupt but to protect

the

economy11 •
During the War and during the period of the operation of Regulation W there was a liquidation of consumer credit from a higher
level of ~10 billion to a low of

05

billion in 1944.

m1ile this

fall in consu:ner credit kept devm inflation, a record volume of
savings widely distributed among .American families was accu::rulatcd .
Thus debt reductions plus a high level or personal income put consumers in a strong financial position .

Regulation :1 was terminated by a
3

Coll8ressional ' esolution on November 1, 1947.
Consumer Credit Trends - 1945-1948:
During the three years after V-J Day, the

ericnn public uent

2

~ Federal Re serve Bulletin, September 1941, P• 825

3
"Consumer Credit Trend" , Federal
·:ugust 1948, P • 897

~ eserve

Bulletin Vol. 34 ,

ro.

S,
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into debt tiore rapidly than at any time during our history.

1t the

same time, consmners were more i'ully employed, they received a record
amount of income, and they continued to increase their exceptionally
large holdings of liquid assets .

This large volume of consumer

spending from current incomes , the rapid turnover of accu::i.ulated
savings, and their increased borrowing , accompanied by l:i.nits on output of goods and ser , ices contributed to an upward spiral of prices .
The unprecedented volume of hone buying during the three-year
period, 1945-1948, added approY.imately $10 billion to the Jortage
debt outstanding; short term credit extended to consumers roso by
more than $8 billion to a new high of $14 billion at the end of June,

1948.

These two types of credit alone passed the $50 billion :::nark

by the end of 1948.

Consumer ' s dirable goods returned or became

more readily available :or the ~irst tiLle since V-J Day; de::iand _or
these goods was supported by a high level of income plus the abil·ty
of consumers, because of their strong cash positions, to get credit
based on their strong cash position.

As consu.'llers savings were

e-

duced and credit terns relaxed, more recourse was nade to instalr.lent
4
credit, thus setting up an inflationary spiral in ~rices .
As the inflationary process continued, it became necessary to
reissue Regulation~ as a peacetime anti-inflatioru:iry oeasu:·o .

c-

cordingly, on Au:ust 19, 1948, the Board of Governors of the •e eral
Reserve Systen issued Reeulation ~ on "Consumer Instalment Credit

4

~

Federal Reserve Bulletin, August 194°, P•

~8

11
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under Public Law 905 , signed by the President ,
becore ef:.ective Se_?tember 20 , 1948.

This

11

ugust 16, 1948 to

edition 11 of Regulation

Wwas the same in form of the Regulation terminated on November 1,
1947.

It covered instalment sales and loans for all kinds of
5
consumer 1 s dirable goods .

Effects of the l2,l& 11 3.egulgtion :::[ 11 :
The 1948 version of Regulation W showed an immediate effect
on economic activity .

The impetus cane, not so much this time from

consumer purchasers of durable goods , but was attributed to t!1e Troasury policy of supporting govermnent bonds at ar above par and by
6
keeping short- term money rates abnormally low.
In 1949 there was a decided change in the economic situation.
There was a decline in business activity, and there was a docline in
prices .

Unemployment increased, and business loans fro~ banks were

bein[; liquidated .
that

11

The Federal _ eserve issued a statement of policy

it ·will be the policy of the (Federal Open J.larket) Coilll'.litteo

to direct purchases , sales , and exchanges of govermnent securities
by the Federal :'.eserve Banks with primary regard to the general

5

Fedei:gl Reserve BuJJ eti,n Vol. 34, r;o . 9, Septe;:iber 1948, P · 1of,6 For detailed account of the Regulation, see pages 1104-1112
6

.

discussion of Federal Reserve i,:onetary and Fiscal Policy is
beyond the scope oft is study. For a lcn~thy c~voraee see
11 Fl..e:;:ible ifonetary Policy 11 , Committee For ..:;conopuc Develo • I? t,
March 1953, faw York
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7

business and credit situation 11 •

In this instance , especially since

the economic situation was grave , this could only mean that tho
Federal Reserve 1'Tou.ld ease credit, rather than restrain or tighten
credit.
The easy money policy of 1949 showed itself early in 1950 .

Bank

credit and ruonetary expansion, interrupted in 1948 and 1949, was resumed in the 12 months ending June , 1950.

Indus~rial production and

enployment resUI:1ed their advance , unemployment demnishc:d , banl: lo~ns
expanded again a!'ld prices advanced .

Stocks of .;oods were being accu::iu-

lated and inflational"'J pressures began to develop several months be~ore
the outbreak of hostilities in Korea .

It is estimated that privately

held deposits and currency amounted to about Jl70 billion on June 30
8

or about v4. 5 billion more in 1949 .
This e:;...'Pansion by the =ec1eral Reserve System designed to co::i.bat
the recession in economic activity by increasing the availability of
credit and creatine easier conditions generally in the money market
evidenced as a fact that recovery was well under way.

It was fw•ther

evident that the :?ederal Reserve Syster:i would .ave to .. odify its
program to foster easier credit conditions .
Defense Production

ct l22Q - Another

e-::ulation

!I £ill Cons· -9

To meet the inflationary spiral in Jrices causvd, in part , JY
7

J.E.~.,

8

p . 12

Federa~ .2.eser:e Bulletin, Vol. 36, Ho . 7, July 1950, p .

m
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the lax 1948 Reserve r'olicy , and in part by the threat of :Tar in
Korea , the :?cderal Reserve Syst em, the Boar d of Governors and the
Open Earket Committee on Au::;ust 18, 1950, agreed on a policy to p_ace
curbs on all inflationnry credit e:::pansion, and took the following
action: (1) the Board of Governors inc_easod the discount rate of
the Federal Reserve Danlc of

ew York from 1-§- to 1 3/4 per cent .

(2)

ChaUGes in Open 11arket techniques were adopted 3 thereby discoura ing
sales of sho:::-t- term securiti es .

(3) Issued a state::ient that "the

Board of Governors of the ::::'ederal Reserve 3ystera and the 2.i'ederal
Open lfa.r::et Co1nni ttoe are preparod to use all tlie :neans at their
cor.I.:J.and to restra:L"l further e::-_Jansion

o-::

bank c:::-edi t consistent with

the policy of na.:.ntainins orderly conditions in the Govern.aent se9
curi t ies market 11 •
Conc;res::i, at this po1nt , revised Federal Reserve
:::-ee;ulatc consLEJ.er c:·edi t and authorized t: e :;:e[julation
credit .
poseC::.

uthority to

o.:

cons t . . uc · .:.on

'i'i -hter require:-1ents ~-n both of th•.3:-.. e crucial :'ielcls ue:·e i:J -

~er tho Jefense Production Act o ~ 1950 .

The rea::;onL'1 ho::-c

by t.10 po ~.cy of the -·c ·e::-.::1 .c erve
10
oi' Governncnt sc:urities in ;;he open m:ir!:ot .

t:.e volt~1e of :1oney · ras su:,plie

in the purc 11asil1 s
Regulation

~r

under the Defense

:.·eduction ,ict of .. 950 cove:.·od

9
"Flexible Uonetsry Policy 11 , Co::ni tteo 2Q!. ~conor:d.r. :Jc•:eJ onnen,;
op . cit . , p . 28

10

11

-~ecent lionetar.f _ Crec.i t Jevelo: :::1,mt 11 , :;'cdcrol Rc::-er ·e ~==~t~:.::.!n
Vol. 36, Ho . 10, 0cto· ,er 1950 , ? • 1219
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11
in part the followine :
Article

D01-m Paypent

ia;turitz

Au~onobiles

33 1/3

Television and Raaio

25 "'/J

15

Furniture

15

c'

15

Home Improvement

10

c'

30

r•

15

1J

JJ

JJ

General Effects of Consumer Credit ~egulations :
Consumer Credit

regulation □

restrict de:nand in two ways .

F:irst ,

stiffer ten1s tend to reduce installment purchases of all articles .
Second, tho increase in outstanding installment credit is checked ,
thereby lm ting the e:;.'y.)ansion of purchasing power and the der:J.1nd
of 5oods in general .
Alar e part of installment credit is eAtended by banks either
directly through loans to ctwtoiiers or indirectly throueh loans to
retail esta blisbments and to finance cor.ipanies .

Any e;::pansion,

whether direct or indirect, adds to the ::oney supply.

Thus in the

economy, uhen production a,:;_:nroaches peak levels , er ,d5.t e;:pansion
feeds inflation been.nee more noncy in the form of banl: deposit::; cone□
into existence to bid :or the same anount

o:

coods .

egulation ct..rtails the e;:pansion o:: installment credit outstanding throuch the o.i:.f ect of the re<;ulations on ne r eredi t

11
For more co~ulete Account, See , Ibid , PP • 1281-1286
~

outstanding, end the effect on neu credit extensions and on repayment::i .
The total vaolume of credit extended is reduced by regulations , in part,
because there are feuer instalm~nt purcha::ics of the articles listed
under the

11

r 2.gulations 11 and , in part , because the hieher down payment

makes the consumer use more cash and les~ credit .

1t

is admitted here

thet the effectivene~s of all consumer credit reGulations depend::; upon
12

the effect to which consumer eoods are bought on credit .

12

.
V
J6 Jo 11 Nove~ber 1~50,
Federal Reserve Bulletin - 0 1 •
,
•
'
pp . 11+27-1432
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The followine table shows the effect of Regulation ~J on Consumer
Credit :
Changes in Consumer Installment Credit Output.;~
(In :Vi.illions of Dollars)
Period

Total Instal ment credit

Instalment Sale Credit
AutomoOther
Total
bile

Instalnent
Loan
Credit

Quarterly
- 406

/.147

/.

9

,L156

,L250

- Second

/.659

/.189

,L199

,L388

/.271

- Third

/.435

,L124

,t141

,L265

fl70

- Fourth

/.434

,L147

/.482

/.629

f305

1948- lst

/.388

/.216

- 43

/.173

,L215

-2nd

/.716

,L235

/.231

/.466

,L250

- 3rd

/.605

,L256

/.220

- 481

/.184

- 4th

,L518

,L103

,L240

,L343

/. 75

Jnnunry

- 180

I-

4

- 164

- lf-0

- 20

February

- 84

,L 35

- 96

- 61

- 23

1947- First

1-1onthl;y
191~9-

*-:-:,
.l!ederal ...enerve B)Jlletin, .April 1949 , page 337

the r.:rowth
From the above table , it shows that in 1949,

o:

automobile credit aJJnost come to a halt, inspite of a modera te increase in February.

The table shows that monetary controcion plus

- 89-

regulations of credit not only halted the sale of listed consumer
goods , but had an almost similar effect on instalment loan credit .
During this period of contractions there was approxm.ately
in loans in neober bank .

01½

billion

Of this amount about ~l billion of this

anount occured in the Central Aeserve City Federal Reserve Banks at

13
New York and Chicago .

llu.l ~cl.the. Federal Reserve System .in
Consumutive Credit Control

The money supply in the United States consist of currency and
bank deposits - demand and time .
largest of the total .

But bank deposits are by far the

At the end of 1952 the total currency in

circulation was \27 . 5 billion.

Demand deposits were vlOl billion

and time deposits were $)66 billion.

..:;ssentially the e::yiansion of the

money supply is a matter of the e:::pansion of bank deposits .
Bank deposits increase when bank loans and investments increase .
For CY.ample, thwn a customer borrows money from his bank, he 1·ecoives
a deposit from his bank which allows him to draw on his bank by neans
of a check .

iJhen the depositor draws his check against t.:is deposit,

the noney does not disappear .

13

The deposit is merely transferred to

"Interruption of fonetary _.xpansion 11 , Federgl Reserve nulletin,
Vol. 35 , Ho . 5, Hay 1949, P• 416
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someone else .

The transfer of funds may take place in many ways .

But

what is of iinportance her o is to point out that once ·",he loan is made
and the sup~ly of money increased, the subsequent shifting ol this
money a bout will not reduce the money supply.

The money sup ,ly will

not be reduced until the loan is repaid thereby r eversing the process
which caused the supply of money to increase , in the first instance .
~~

the ?xPansion Qf. honey Suoply:

The process of expansion of money cannot go on forever .
are limits .

There

In the first place, b"nks will not lend money in excess

of an amount that appear sound and profitable .

Secondly, since each

bank must be ready to r.1cet withdrawls , ea ch bank must hold a sufficient
amount of liquidably assets of kinds that can be read::..ly and certainly
converted into cash - banker ' s acceptances, short-term government
securities, and certain other assets serve this purpose .

In the third

place and certainly the most important limit on the expansion of the
money supply through bank loans , investments anc deposits is ·, 10 leGal
reserve requirement imposed by the Federal - eserve .

The legal r eserve requirement is ~ost important . The ~ederal
Reserve can control tho amount of reserves the banks , in the agcregate,
have .

It can also , within a range fL~ed by law, change

ratio of reserves to deposits .

e required

The ability of the Federal Reserve to

increase or decrease -:-,he ~cnber bank ' s need _or reserve::; enable the
1

Federal Reserve to restrict or to expand the bank s ability to l end .
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Need :f!2l: Consumer Credit Control:
Installment Credit could never have attained its high measure
of importance in the economy if there were no important advantages .
For the Consumer , the chief advantage is that it enables the consumer
to obtain the goods he wants :i.Inmediately and to use them while paying
for them out of his income .

He does not have to wait until he has

the cash; he usually uses credit - - furnished by others .
If the tenns of the credit are right and the article is paid
for more quickly than it wears out, the consumer has been benefitted
by his accumulation of new durable goods for which he has paid .

But

this t ype of instalment credit behavior is not usually the case,
and the consumer finds himself i n trouble .
Consumer instalment credit problems in the short run are factors
making for instability in the economy.

This is due , in part , to the

relationship of instalment credit to durable goods sales.

une docs

not argue that installment credit is the all important factor in the
economy leading to instability in the economy, but it is a factor
which can make for economic instability.

In times of boom, there is

the tendency of sellers of durable consUI:1er goods to expand their
sales by easy dm-m payments (sometimes no down payment) and by control of long maturities rather than by reducing prices and :ila~roving
quality and. services .

Competitors also relax their credit terms

thereby fostering an unsound credit st~ucture in inatoment businesses
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as a whole .

Soon, the lenders become "loaned
_ _ .JL:o" , th ere by creating
14
an unhealthy condition in the economy.
There are those who argue that Govern:nent control of consumer
credit i s not necessary .

They argue further that individual credit

extension is a transaction between the seller and t he buyer .

'·Thether

or not the buyer is a good risk is for the seller to decide .

The

energies of Governra.ent , they say further , should be expended on
matters of greater concern and which exert a greater impact on the

15
economy as a whole .
This argument is not valid , in that it tends to ignore as well
as to minimize the i::J.pact of consumer cr edit on the economic system
as a whole .

Credit extension is .,ore than a transaction between the

purchaser and the seller; and , furthermore , the soundness of the credit
is not the all important aspect of the matter .

An e::tcnsion of credit

puts more purchasing power into the hands of the consumer, which he
did not have before .

Once the consumer spends it, say, for an auto-

mobile or other durable coods , it is passed on to others an . much or
all of it remains to s~ell the demand for goods in ~eneral until this
credit is actually paid off .

The result must be a more or less

14
15

Federal Reserve Author::..ties Conct:r on this point.
Bulletin, April 1949 , p. 343
See R. M. Evans , "Consumer Credit Regulation in ,Garrison
Economyn, ~ Federal Re ,·erve Bulletin, Vol. J.J , Io . 11,
November 1953 , P• 1437

oneral
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rise in prices or rise in production or both.
Basis £'.Qr Federal Reserve Regulations :
To understand the basis on which the Federal Reserve can justifibaly enter :nto the regulation of consumer credit is to be found
in an understanding of the source from which funds come to finance
consumer credit .

Part of this purchasing power which is put i n

circulation to support consumer credit is provided by savings of the
people .

Part of it , and a larger part of it coraes directly or in-

directly, from bank credit .
It is tl1is bank crcc.l.i t which is o.:: special interest to the
Federal Reserve .

As it has been pointed out earlier in this chapter,

when total bank credit expands, bank deposits (de::nnnd) ex:".)and .

These

demand deposi ts , at least, are mone~· in a real sense; they are subject to check , and an excess of money (de:nand deposits) in relation to
the output of commodities and services can mean but one thing -- inflation .

It is this immediate connection between tl

e

volu.'"ils of

consumer credit and the econo:::ny 1 s total raoney oupply which is of great
concern and furnishes the nain reason why ,he Federal

eserve Systo

accepts the responsibility for regulation of tl e terms of consUDer

16.
credit .
In r elatively normal times , when ry..-,oduction can be e:::pando

16
Ibid ., p . 1438

to
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meet increased demand, an expansion of credit may result primarily
in an e;:pansion

01

production rather than pricen.

Here the vollllll.e

of production will depend, in general , on the volume of sales of
durable goods i.-; hich accounts for most of the credit e:;;:tended .

A Honey Management Lesson:
The Federal Reserve has at its disposal two types of control
over bank credit which when e:rnrcised wiL or should influence its
use.

These are the Quantitative Credit Control l-!echanisr:is, used to

influence the cost and the terms of credit.

These quantitative credit

control mechanisms will thereby control the total volume of available
credit employed in the country.

The major quantitative controls a~e:

(1) changing of the Rediscount Rate (2) Open Harket Operations (3)
Varying the lezal reserve requirements of member banks .

'lnen there

are the Qualitative Credit Control Eechanisns , which restrict the use
of Federal Reserve credit, someti::nes c1llcd Selective Credit Control ,
includes (1) 7ixing of margin requirements upon loa s secured by
11

stock and bond collateral (2) Curbs by 11filr ect act:·on speculotion
credit expansion (3) Horal Suasion - public state::aent ....ade by Fe'eral
Reserve in dischar ging its responsibilities concerning the une of

17

credit

(4) Regulation of credit for consumptive pur_;1osos .

One can see at a glance that the quanti to ti ve credit controls

17

•ederal Reserve Bulle~in, Vol . 40 , lo . 12, Deco oer 1954, pp .
1237- 1241
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when used alone would prove rather ineffective in the matter or
consumer credit regulation and control .

They could influence con-

sumer credit control only in an indirect manner .

The measures the

government has instituted through the Federal Reserve are designed
to reduce e::ceos purchasing power in a direct way.

The Feder al

Reserve attempts to reduce the gap between demand and supply and
thereby dampen the upward pressure on prices .
Thus credit is regulated in two ways .

First, it is tightened

at the source , that is , through the banking sysLe~.

Sec~nd, it is

tightened at the consumer ' s end by regulation of consumer instalment
credit, and residental real estate mortgage credit .

If it were

possible to adjust taxes and credit terms so that the demand :or
goods would be on the average about equal to the GU_:?ply, the condition would be ideal.

There would not be or could not be any inflat-

ionary pressures on the price level.

Uhereas , the condition may be

highly desirable , it is hardly workable .
Federal

eserve restrictions imposed on consl.liler credit help to

achieve two major objectives .

First , the tightening of credit on

certain listed articles should and did r eC:.uce de:nnnd fo:::.- these specific goods to levels more nearly in l.::.ne with the su~ply of these
goods .

Toe result diJ relieve :pressure on prices of tho::,e goods .

In

the second place Federal _ eserve restrictions on lioted g"ods ·rill
Conoumer
tend to curtail to a degree the deraand for unlisted goods .
credit regulation can help limit the total demand by checking ~he
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e:;,,.'Pansion of credit balances , and if carried far enoU£h , by causing
a contraction o

such balances .

In conclusion, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that an
extension of credit for consumer purchases is an extension of purchasing power .

Once this purchasing power is in circulation it

contributes to total de:nand .
t o head o~f inflation.

Consumer credit regulations can help

Any consumer credit )rogram must be fle::dble ,

such as the con:.rols used by the Federal Reserve .
two reasons .

~

, the future is Hard to predict .

This is true for
Second , it is

hard to predict the effect of consumer credit regulation in the
demand for particular goods in general .

For example , reculations

to restrict automobile pi.echases may c, use the de:nand for other

18

goods to be kept up by using raore c1·edit than necessary.
ConsUL1er credit control cannot stop inflation .
part of a general anti- inflationary program,

It is only

The ad..--;iinistration

of this program is (as it should be) carried out by the Federal
Reserve Board.

18
Federal Reserve BH.J,letin, November 1950, op . cit .

• 1/440
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CHAPTER VII
SUMI

Y

m CONCLUSION

Thus far , the writer has attempted to set forth some of the
fundamental principles of the American Banking System in their relation to the changing progress of other American businesses .
The vn,iter further attempted to give the reader a clear understanding of how the system is set up , how it is organized and how it
is controlled -- with stress being placed chiefly on what is termed
the Federal

.1.

eserve System and its function in the American economy.

In concluding this study, the writer will bring to your attention the problems to be solved in the study, which included questions
to be answered .
1.

They ·were as follows :

·lbat influence did banks in England have upon the Central

Banking System of America?

(

The earliest banks in this count17 are part and parcel in
structure and function as the bnnk o- ~land .

This fact is shown

in one of the earliest banks on record, namely, the bank of Horth

America , founded in 1872 .

The same principles ~or the most part,

are reflected in the First Bank of the United States , the Second
Bank of tLe United Sta ues and in the Uational B nk .
2.

How did the State Bank Growth in the United 3tates after

the failure of t he
1816 renovate the A:nerican Banking Sys t em aft·er
First and Second B~nks of the United States?
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With the failure to recharter the Second Bank of the United
States the Federal Government withdrew from any direct supervision
of the nation I s banking until the creation of the National Bonkina
System in 1863.

From 1836 to 1863 the United States had no national

banks , banking operations being performed by state-chartered banks ,
private banks and pet ban.~s .

At this time , collateral could be called

for, if the Secretary of th3 Treasury deemed it advisable , and must
be given if the deposits exceeded one- half of a bnnk 1 s capital;
weekly returns of the condition of the bank were reauired and the
bank must be open to examination at any time .
It was then ]aid dm-m t:..at any bank employed as a depository
should credit as specie all sums deposited to the credit of the
United States , and thnt no bank should be selected which did not
redeem its notes in specie or which issued any note oi' a deno::tlnation
less than five dollars .

It was further provided that, if the deposit

exceeded a fourth part of the bank's capital for at least three
months , the bank should ?aY 2% interest on the excess deposit .

App-

arently the interests of the ~overnment ,-1ere well sofeguarded .
The banking laws of t.1e v:1rious states were e::trc::iely diverse
and in many cases they were unbelievnbly lax .

l•;any o- the state

banks had almost no capital funds of their o·,m t nd operated b'J
issuing notes and receiving depo::;i ts .

Laws prescribing r 3serves

and limitinG note issues varied greatly from state to state .

3. :Jhat were the conditions existinG under the State Bank era
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that led Gongress to enact the national Jank

ct in 1863;

The Civil ,far served to foc us attention on the inadequacy of
the existin~ b::inking and monetary structure and to emphasize the
need for a national i3::nkin

0

System which would both improve banking

f ,cilities and provide a more uniform and sound note issue .

To

meet these needs , end to :pro·vide a market for the b:mds uhich the
Federal Gove::-nm.ent was i ssuing to help finance the war , C:on6ress
ena cted the ·rational Ba~c Act i n 1863 .

4. Uhat we ... e the existing condi tions under the national
Banking System that gave r ise t o the Federal • eserve System?

The ::iain defects of the National Banking System that 6a,e rise
to the Federal

eser ve may be sur;imarized as follovs : {l) .3cattered

eserves , (2) Inelasticity of Hatio:nal Brnk Hotos , (3) P-jl'amiding

O-

••eserves , (4) Inelasticity of Bc.nk Credit , (5) lo Domestic Clearins
System, (6) ... oreign :::::Xchange DL'ficul ties , (7) lJo protection of the
:ration Is Gold : eserve , (8) Ho standard.:.zer" comerc.:.al -:aper available
for investments by banks , ~nd etc .

5.

How did the operation of the Fcde1·al .,eserve Syste::i become

a lesson in 1:onetary li8nagement?
By the use of the

;- t

i,_
u.us

at its disposal .

t·-10

t ype::;

O :"

-

control o7er ba : cnciit tl at

Jar.iely -- The

l ec 1an:1 s. s , used to influence the coat and

t.10

to-,. s

aco
· 1 a::e: (1) c·.Gn"'in,'.; -:> t;hc ··
Tb.e :-mjo1· c;,u.:1ntitati·'c con-.:.ro
.. s
,.
( ) 7ar-:in:; tl e , e_.aJ. :ese ·e
en : :[!r :ct Opera .:.:.ons 3
.,

t
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requiremen~s of member banks .

Second, The )lalitative Credit Control

Hechanisms, which restricts the use of Federal Reserve credit, sometimes called Selective Credit Control , includes

(1) Fixing of margin

require:::nents unon loans secw'ed by stock and bond collateral (2)
Curbs by

11

direct action 11 speculation credit expansion (3) Horal

Juasion - public statement made by Federal i eserve in discharging its
responsibilities concerning the use of credit

(4) Regulation of credit

for consumptive purposes .
Whereas both The Quantitative Credit Control 1:echaninms and
The : uali tati ve Credit Control l iechanisms are of profound importance
in and to the ::cono~c System as a whole, it is the Qualitative
Credit Control Mechanisms or Selective Control J,iechanisms which is ,
nanely, :::·egulation of credit for consunptive purposes that is of
especial importance as a lesson in money :management under the
Federal Reserve .

The uriter believes that this lesson in money

w.anagement was adequately discussed in Chapter VI .
The writer agrees that the American Bankin:; System is not
perfect ; a perfect banking syste:::n r.~y be likened unto a beautifully
constructed organ, capable of producing delightful har:nony, provided
the organist who sits at the console thoroughly understando his art .
No matter how ,erfect the instrllllent , it is the skill of the oon at
the keyboard that tells .

So it is with banking -- no .iatter low

perfect the system, reliable and e~:perienced bankers are wi1'.lt count .
There can be no doubt that the system of b:mking in this country

though an improvement over the old system "i•rbich was a aftermath of
the Civil War and which serve its purpose admirably, has to be
modernized in order to meet changed conditions brought about by the
development of a rapid connnunication between distant points .
Consumer credit has grown to such unprecddented heights in the
economy today that its regulation has become an absolute necessity
if the present social order is to be continued .

The Federal ReservG

System is the best agency we have at present to regulate the
tremendous amow1t of consumer credit and to direct its flow into
proper channels so that it will serve the economic s.,rstem est .
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